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CRAWFORD'S TRIANGLE: DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND THE RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION*
DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER*
This Article examines an issue of great importance to the future of
domestic violence prosecution: when does the admission of out-of-
court statements by an "absent accuser" violate a defendant's right
of confrontation? Given the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Davis v. Washington, which promulgated an analysis inherently
incompatible with the realities of battering, my critique anticipates
the prospective factual determinations confronting lower courts and
suggests that an evolution in judicial reasoning is warranted. Even
assuming the occurrence of this proposed paradigm shift, however,
there will be hearsay in victimless prosecutions that would have
been admissible before Crawford v. Washington but will now be
properly excluded. Given this reality, forfeiture is the next frontier
of domestic violence prosecution. Accordingly, I devote
considerable attention to the question of how to import forfeiture
principles to the domestic violence context. Battering-a course of
conduct that is ongoing, patterned, and characterized by control-is
qualitatively different from violence against strangers. I argue that
judicial reliance on precedent and analogy is therefore inadequate
to construct a doctrinal framework applicable to domestic violence
cases. This Article provides a roadmap for the necessary
reconceptualization of forfeiture.
I conclude by contemplating the implications of what I characterize
as a relational approach to confrontation. I posit that the
Confrontation Clause is fundamentally concerned with the
triangular relationship among accused, accuser, and the state.
Asking the relational question reveals a set of previously
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unexamined assumptions about this triangle. By exposing-and, in
the domestic violence realm, contesting-the conventional
alignment of the triangle, a relational approach transforms how we
think about the meaning of confrontation.
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INTRODUCTION
In criminal justice circles it has become widely accepted that
prosecutors may, and often do, pursue domestic violence charges
against a defendant despite a victim's unwillingness to cooperate with
law enforcement efforts.1 Notwithstanding considerable scholarly
controversy,2 it is fair to say that prosecutors have remained willing
and able to convict batterers without the testimony of victims.3 This
1. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing common reasons for
victim reluctance to cooperate with the prosecution).
2. See, e.g., Cathleen A. Booth, No-Drop Policies: Effective Legislation or
Protectionist Attitude?, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 621 (1999) (analyzing the drawbacks of no-drop
policies in relation to civil protection orders); Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 853 (1994) (discussing no-drop prosecution policies and their role in
combating domestic violence in the face of nonparticipating victims); Cheryl Hanna, No
Right To Choose, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (defending the need for mandated
participation of domestic violence victims to address impediments associated with
victimless prosecutions).
3. Prosecutors' offices have with increasing frequency developed policies and
training protocols regarding so-called "victimless" or "evidence-based" prosecution. See,
e.g., WiS. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MODEL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
(2002), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/cvs/documents/DAR/ModelDVPolicies.pdf
(stating that "the decision to prosecute is based on evidence, not on the cooperation of the
victim"); Prosecutor's Protocol for Domestic Violence, Livingston County, New York,
District Attorney's Office (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (establishing
procedures and protocol for "Recanting or Non-Appearing Victims"); Domestic Violence
Protocol, San Diego County, California, District Attorney's Office (on file with author)
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reality may be changing, however, as a result of the Supreme Court's
2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington4 and its more recent
pronouncement in Davis v. Washington.5
Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause generally requires
the exclusion of out-of-court statements against a criminal defendant,
provided those statements are deemed "testimonial."6  Hearsay
previously admissible as a matter of evidence law' must now
accordingly be subjected to a separate, distinct, and rigorous
constitutional analysis. Quite suddenly, the evidence most commonly
relied upon in "evidence-based" domestic violence prosecutions8 may
be excluded based on the defendant's right of confrontation. And
indeed thousands of cases raising challenges of this sort have already
been decided in Crawford's wake.'
("Charges may be filed without victim participation if there is deemed to be sufficient
independent corroboration of the crime to prove the charges ... ").
I use "victimless" and "evidence-based" prosecution synonymously to refer to
prosecution of "domestic violence" in the absence of a victim's testimony. Each term,
however, has its limitations and requires a word of caution: "victimless prosecution" has a
tendency to obscure the fact that someone was in fact victimized by the battering conduct
at issue in the case-she simply is not present at the trial to testify to the abuse; "evidence-
based" prosecution is also problematic, as it may incorrectly suggest that the testimony of
a victim is something other than evidence.
4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Provided the declarant is deemed "unavailable" to
testify at trial, testimonial statements may be admissible if the defendant was given an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant when the statement was made. Id.; see also
infra note 307 (discussing unavailability). In the domestic violence context, victims' out-
of-court statements are rarely cross-examined. But see Tom Lininger, Prosecuting
Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 784-97 (2005) (proposing creation of new
opportunities for pretrial cross-examination), Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford's Impact on
Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 411, 415-16 (2005) (suggesting the need for early confrontation opportunities).
7. As a general rule, hearsay is not admissible unless it qualifies as one of a number
of enumerated exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted"); FED. R. EVID. 802 (general rule of
exclusion); FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 (delineating exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
8. See Lininger, supra note 6, at 771 (discussing the reasons why hearsay is often the
"linchpin" of domestic violence prosecutions).
9. Between March and December of 2004 alone, approximately 500 opinions treating
Crawford were issued. Lininger, supra note 6, at 766-67; see also Robert M. Pitler,
Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its
Past, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 14 (2005) ("Almost overnight, Crawford spawned an entire
cottage industry, including several hundred reported cases ...."). The published case law
does not, however, fully capture the impact of Crawford on domestic violence prosecution.
For instance, prosecutors are now dismissing larger numbers of cases where victims are
uncooperative or unavailable. See Lininger, supra note 6, app. 1 at 820 (reporting that
seventy-six percent of prosecutors responding to survey of sixty offices reported a higher
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As commentators have uniformly observed, the decision
transformed the constitutional landscape.1° But despite considerable
scholarly discourse," there is significant disagreement regarding
whether the Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is
correct'--and even how the holding should be understood. 3 We do
know that the "reliability" approach, 4 which for decades governed
the admissibility of out-of-court statements against a criminal
defendant, has been largely, if not entirely, dismantled.15  Far less
settled is what doctrinal changes the Court intended to effectuate
with its new testimonial approach to the confrontation right.
dismissal rate post-Crawford). Domestic violence defendants are also more likely after
Crawford to take their cases to trial. See id. (reporting that fifty-nine percent of
prosecutors surveyed indicated that defendants are less likely to plead guilty after
Crawford). Wholly unmeasureable are the increased pressures to which battered women
are now being subjected in light of the new obstacles in the path of victimless prosecution.
Cf Hanna, supra note 2, at 1865 ("Pro-prosecution advocates argue that aggressive
policies take the burden off the victim by removing her as the 'plaintiff.' They contend
that the batterer has less incentive to try to control or intimidate his victim once he
realizes that she no longer controls the process.").
10. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision
Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 2, 5 (2004) ("In Crawford v.
Washington ... the U.S. Supreme Court radically transformed its doctrine governing the
Confrontation Clause .... "); Lininger, supra note 6, at 748 (characterizing the impact of
Crawford as "dramatic"); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 511 (2005) (asserting
that Crawford "radically changed Confrontation Clause doctrine").
11. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 10; Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A
Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569 (2004); Mosteller, supra note 10. For a helpful collection of
scholarship on the opinion and its meaning, also see BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW's
symposium issue entitled, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2005).
12. See Pitler, supra note 9, at 12-14 (highlighting the differences in opinion over the
decision in Crawford). Compare, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know,
and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (2005) (arguing that Crawford was wrongly decided), with Roger
C. Park, Purpose as a Guide to the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK.
L. REV. 297, 297 (2005) (stating that he "applaud[s] the change from Ohio v. Roberts to
Crawford v. Washington").
13. See Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 401, 402 (2005) ("The lack of concrete guidance in Crawford has led to inconsistent
rulings by the lower courts .... [N]o one is certain what Crawford really means.").
14. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Under Roberts, any out-of-court
statement offered for its truth against a criminal defendant raised a Confrontation Clause
issue. However, provided that a statement was considered "reliable"--either because it
fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or was supported by "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness"-it could be admitted without running afoul of the
Constitution. Id.
15. Whether the Roberts framework continues to control the admissibility of
nontestimonial statements is debatable. See infra note 105.
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In this Article, I take no position on whether Crawford was
rightly decided or how its dictates should be implemented, important
though these inquiries are. Rather, without challenging either its
mode of constitutional interpretation or its fidelity to originalist
intent, I adopt the Court's holding in Crawford as the starting point
for my discussion. My interest lies in exploring the ways in which
courts and scholars are, in the face of significant doctrinal
indeterminacy,16 reasoning about domestic violence and, further, how
this reasoning could be improved. My contention is that notions of
domestic violence underlying contemporary Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence are flawed. Because judges are misunderstanding the
dynamics of battering, the wrong questions are being asked when
Crawford is applied to cases involving intimates.
Battering is fundamentally different from violence between non-
intimates.17 As a consequence, default to analogy is inadequate to the
task of defining the confrontation right in domestic violence cases.
This inadequacy is compounded by a judicial inclination toward
"looking backwards"'" in time to locate the meaning of confrontation.
When the Sixth Amendment was passed, of course, wife battering was
16. In the aftermath of Crawford, commentators were in general agreement that the
Court had failed to articulate a workable definition of "testimonial." See, e.g., Friedman,
supra note 10, at 8 ("The most significant question that arises.., is how far the category of
'testimonial' statements extends."); Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements Under
Crawford: What Makes Testimony... Testimonial?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 281 (2005) ("The
majority in Crawford ... left the precise meaning of 'testimonial' statements 'for another
day,' casting a shadow of uncertainty over a major component of criminal practice."
(citations omitted)); Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 36 (2005) ("Justice Scalia did not provide
a complete definition of a testimonial statement."). Moreover, the Court's recent effort in
Davis to clarify the meaning of "testimonial" raised as many questions as it purported to
answer. As I will argue, the opinion is sufficiently fact-bound and insufficiently reasoned
so as to leave the lower courts in a continuing state of confusion. See infra notes 148-99
and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing Davis).
17. Violence between non-intimates is paradigmatic criminal conduct, in contrast to
domestic violence, which, in important respects, lies outside the bounds of traditional
criminal law structures. For a more thorough analysis of the features that define
"paradigmatic" crime, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm
of Battering: A Call To Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
959, 971-74 (2004). Although child abuse and elder abuse share many of the dynamics
distinguishing battering from paradigmatic criminal conduct, and much of the discussion
that follows applies to violence in intimate relationships generally, I focus here on adult
partner abuse and the law's response to it.
18. Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact
on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 313 (2005)
(discussing the "historic approach to confrontation").
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lawful, 9 suggesting'the need for an approach that is something other
than "purely historic."2 The framework of Crawford thus presents a
formidable conceptual challenge: to somehow extrapolate from the
treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh21-which the Court has
characterized as "a paradigmatic confrontation violation" 22 -a
confrontation right with meaning in the context of domestic violence
prosecution. In short, if Raleigh's accuser, Lord Cobham, is the
"paradigmatic" absent accuser, and women who were battered at the
time of the amendment's passage could not even be accusers, how
should we make sense of victimless domestic violence prosecution
and the right of confrontation?
Part I tells a story of the absent accuser that differs in important
ways from the tale of Lord Cobham. I present a domestic violence
case fairly described as typical, in order to answer the question of why
a prosecutor would pursue charges without a cooperative victim. By
showing how one defendant's battering conduct over a period of
19. "Ambivalence surrounding criminalization efforts has enduring roots in the
Anglo-American common law, which until the late nineteenth century 'structured
marriage to give a husband superiority over his wife in most aspects of the relationship.'
This structurally sanctioned superiority encompassed the husband's right to 'command his
wife's obedience, and subject her to corporal punishment or "chastisement" if she defied
his authority.' Integral to the law's construction of the marital relationship was its defense
of hierarchy, of which physical abuse was but one component." Tuerkheimer, supra note
17, at 969 (quoting Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122, 2123 (1996)).
20. Raeder, supra note 18, at 312.
21. In 1603, Sir Walter Raleigh was tried for treason for conspiring to overthrow King
James I Of England. Crawford v. United States, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004). As recounted by
the Crawford Court:
Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an
examination before the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh's trial, these
were read to the jury. Raleigh argued that Cobham had lied to save himself:
"Cobham is absolutely in the King's mercy; to excuse me cannot avail him; by
accusing me he may hope for favour." Suspecting that Cobham would recant,
Raleigh demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that "[t]he Proof of
the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it.
Call my accuser before my face . The judges refused, and, despite Raleigh's
protestations that he was being tried "by the Spanish Inquisition," the jury
convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death.
Id. (citations omitted). For a thorough account of Sir Walter Raleigh's trial, see 2
COBBETTr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1-60 (1809).
22. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-52 (stating that the Confrontation Clause "was directed
[at] ... notorious treason cases like Raleigh's; Raleigh's trial has long been thought a
paradigmatic confrontation violation."). Justice Scalia's reliance on Sir Walter Raleigh's
trial, and other treason cases notorious at the time of the framing, to support his view of
the confrontation right has been criticized as "flawed" and "oversimplified." Davies,
supra note 12, at 121-22.
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years impacted his victim's willingness to testify for the prosecution,
this Part begins to demonstrate why courts must view abuse in
context when making the factual determinations required by
Crawford and Davis.
In the discussion that follows, I examine cases and commentary
treating the right of confrontation in victimless domestic violence
prosecutions. My objective in doing so is to expose the assumptions
underlying application of Crawford to the battering context: put
simply, courts and scholars are failing to acknowledge the ongoing
course of conduct that characterizes domestic violence.23 A full
appreciation of the dynamics of abuse and attention to the context of
relationship that embeds victim and defendant results in what I will
call a "relational approach" to Confrontation Clause analysis.24 I
move on in Parts II and III to develop this approach in the two broad
doctrinal contexts that will continue to arise most frequently in this
post-Crawford era.
In Part II, I explore how courts apply the definition of
"testimonial" to battering cases. In contrast to previous scholarship
in this area, my interest lies not in evaluating the relative merits of
various formulations of the term,25 but, rather, in critiquing
unexamined assumptions that inform judicial analyses regardless of
the precise legal language employed.26 In evaluating whether a
hearsay statement is testimonial, courts have adopted a theoretical
framework that posits a binary relationship between "crying for help"
and "providing information" for investigatory purposes.27  The
Supreme Court's recent holding in Davis is a striking-and, for
obvious reasons, most influential-instance of this dichotomization.
Despite apparent judicial certainty to the contrary, in the
domestic violence realm, the dichotomy is false.28 By this contention,
I mean to suggest more than that officers and victims have "mixed
motives" that are often difficult to discern.29  Rather, from the
23. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Conclusion.
25. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text (describing differing formulations
of the term "testimonial").
26. After Davis, lower courts are, of course, bound to apply the standard dictated by
the Court to the extent the holding can be understood. Given the definitional
indeterminacy still remaining, however, I suspect that there will be considerable variation
in judicial implementation of Davis's "test." See infra notes 149-200 and accompanying
text (critiquing Davis).
27. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("In many, if not most, cases where police
2006]
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perspective of battered women, the meaning of "exigency"-a
construct deeply embedded in the now-reigning definition of
testimonial3 -- is distinct from that experienced by victims of other
types of crime. Abuse victims are faced with a threat that is ongoing.
In order for the exigency confronting her to be resolved, a battered
woman must often provide information regarding past violence; she
does so in order to prevent imminent violence. That is, the two
functions conceived by courts as distinct (and binary) are not only
practically inseverable but conceptually so as well. By failing to
account for this reality, the dominant judicial approach has resulted,
and will continue to result in, the classification as "testimonial" of
many statements by domestic violence victims that are, in fact, cries
for help in response to immediate danger. Part II argues that
decontextualized determinations of "exigency"-and continued
adherence to an inapt dualism-will inevitably skew judicial
treatment of Confrontation Clause challenges.
Even enlightened analysis of the definitional question, however,
will lead to the exclusion of out-of-court statements that, while
admissible in victimless prosecutions before Crawford, will now be
properly categorized as testimonial.3' Given this reality, new
attention must be given to the rule of forfeiture by misconduct, which
precludes a defendant from asserting confrontation rights where he is
responsible for procuring the trial absence of a witness.32 As
advancement of forfeiture arguments in domestic violence cases
becomes increasingly commonplace,33  the doctrine-as yet
undeveloped in the battering realm-must evolve.
Part III provides a conceptual roadmap for this doctrinal
transformation. I suggest that, as courts begin formulating a
forfeiture framework applicable to domestic violence cases, reliance
respond to a report of a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or
otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the police, are
both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather evidence. Assigning one of these
two 'largely unverifiable motives' primacy requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose
that will rarely be present-and is not reliably discernible.") (internal citation omitted);
see infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
31. Justice Scalia's unhelpful observation that "testimonial statements are what they
are" aside, Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6, it is undoubtedly true that certain statements by
domestic violence victims are testimonial pursuant to fair application of the Crawford
framework.
32. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
33. The Davis Court's recent reiteration of the principle of forfeiture and its dictum
discussing evidentiary standards applicable to forfeiture hearings, see Davis, 126 S. Ct. at
2280, will further accelerate the development of law in this area.
[Vol. 85
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on precedent and analogy will inevitably subvert the rule's equitable
rationale.34 This Part reveals that the influence of batterers over
victims departs in important ways from the traditional witness
tampering paradigm: in most abusive relationships, "tampering"
conduct is inexorably bound up in the violent exercise of power that is
itself criminal.35 Abuse occurring prior to or during the crime for
which the defendant is being tried often functions to undermine a
victim's willingness to cooperate with prosecutorial efforts; classic
forfeiture analysis is insufficiently contextualized to contemplate
these dynamics.36 I argue that judicial forfeiture determinations must
take account of the characteristics that distinguish domestic violence
from other types of criminal tampering.37 Without accounting for the
patterned, ongoing nature of abuse, courts cannot correctly interpret
the meaning of forfeiture. Thus, fidelity to the theoretical
underpinnings of the doctrine demands new consideration of its
applicability to victimless domestic violence prosecutions.38
Finally, I conclude by offering a theory of how the previous
discussion might help to conceptualize the meaning of the
confrontation right.39 Crawford undermined the notion that ensuring
evidence "reliability" is the exclusive function of the right of
confrontation; yet the opinion erected no new theoretical
underpinning. In the face of this void, the need to articulate a
normative vision of confrontation has never been more compelling. I
suggest that when the realities of domestic violence are attended to, a
new paradigm for Confrontation Clause jurisprudence-one that is,
in essence, relational-can be discerned.40
Adopting a relational approach to confrontation allows
Crawford to be fairly applied to domestic violence prosecutions.41
More broadly, asking the relational question reveals the operation of
a set of previously unexamined assumptions regarding the triangle of
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra notes 294-305 and accompanying text.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
38. See infra Part III.C. I also consider how courts might analyze the issue of witness
"unavailability" for purposes of allowing the prosecution to invoke the forfeiture doctrine.
See infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 345-65 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Conclusion. My use of the word relational in this context is not derived
from the scholarly tradition of relational feminism. Rather, it is a way of characterizing an
approach to understanding the Confrontation Clause that views the alignment of
relationships between accuser, accused, and state as central to its descriptive and
normative aspirations.
41. See infra notes 340-44 and accompanying text.
20061
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relationships relevant to the Confrontation Clause context-
relationships between accuser, state, and accused.4 2 By exposing-
and, in the domestic violence realm, contesting43-the conventional
alignment of this triad, which I call "Crawford's Triangle," a
relational approach has the potential to transform how we think
about the value of confrontation in domestic violence prosecutions
and beyond.4
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE "ABSENT ACCUSER"
Angela first contacted the police regarding her relationship with
Victor Santiago in January 1996.41 According to her written
complaint, for about a week Victor (whom she referred to as her "ex-
boyfriend") had been harassing Angela,46 banging on her apartment
door, threatening her, and hitting her in the face.47
A few months later, police were again summoned to Angela's
apartment.48 When they arrived, the officers heard her screaming for
help and Victor yelling, "I'm going to fucking kill you. ' 49  After
observing Victor on top of Angela, who was lying on the floor, police
broke down the door to gain access to the apartment.50 Four officers
were needed to pry Victor off of Angela, and he continued kicking
and spitting even after he was separated from her.5' Angela, who was
"crying and disheveled," explained to police what had happened. The
two had begun arguing on the first floor of the building. Victor then
dragged Angela by the hair up four flights of stairs to her apartment
42. See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 349-55 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 356-65 and accompanying text.
45. People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 WL 21507176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003).
Before trial, the prosecution moved for an order allowing the use of various out-of-court
statements made by Angela. As characterized by the court, "[tihe People's theory [of
admissibility] is that the defendant's longstanding pattern of physical and emotional abuse
toward Angela R. effectively forced her to become unavailable as a witness for the People
at trial." Id. at *1. The court held a pretrial hearing on the issue of whether the defendant
forfeited his right to challenge the introduction of Angela's statements. Id. at *1-2. The
facts that follow are contained in the written opinion granting the prosecution motion. See
infra notes 327-38 and accompanying text (discussing the judge's decision).
46. Angela's last name is omitted in the published opinion "to spare her further
embarrassment." Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *1 n.1.
47. Id. at *5.
48. Id. While not entirely clear from the opinion, it seems likely that the police were
called to the scene by one of Angela's neighbors.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
[Vol. 85
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and once inside, began hitting her in the face and choking her. All
the while, Victor prevented Angela from escaping. 2
Angela was taken by police to the hospital where, according to
medical records, she acknowledged ongoing domestic violence by
Victor, but refused to give information regarding her injuries and
stated she was "ok" and "want[ed] to go home."53 The defendant was
arrested for the incident.54 Initially, Angela cooperated with the
prosecution, but when the case was scheduled for trial, she "refused
to go forward," resulting in dismissal of the charges.
In December 1996, Angela again filed a report of domestic
violence with the local precinct.56 According to Angela's account,
when she asked Victor (whom she then referred to as her "common-
law husband") to turn down his loud music at three a.m., he set a
towel on fire, "came over to the bed [and] said he'll burn me and the
apt. I grab [sic] the towel and put it off." 57 The officer who took the
report noted that Angela " 'had visible burns on her left hand and
was visibly shaken and fearsome that common-law husband had
returned."58 The defendant was arrested for the incident, but the case
was dismissed when Angela refused to cooperate with the
prosecution.5 9
Around this time, the domestic violence counselor at the local
police precinct began keeping a log documenting her efforts to assist
Angela.6' The counselor's log indicates that in July 1997, Angela
stated that she had no further contact with Victor.61 However, in
June 2000, Angela filed yet another report with the police (this time
describing her relationship with Victor as having a "child in
common"), stating, "'[we] been having promble [sic]. I have been
asking him to please leave and to just stay away,' " and that morning
he hit her " 'all over [her] face and neck.' "62 The domestic violence
counselor's log indicates that Angela did not appear for her scheduled
follow-up interview.63 A few months later, Angela explained that "all
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *6.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *7. The police kept a list called "High Propensity for Recurrence of
Domestic Violence," which included Angela and Victor. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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is well" and that she and Victor were "counseling each other."'  In
September, however, Angela reached out to the domestic violence
counselor, admitting that Victor was continuing to abuse her and that
she was "scare[d] to do something because he has threatened her if
she seeks help."65 Over the next four months, the domestic violence
log indicates multiple contacts with Angela: she variously cancelled
appointments, accepted referrals for safety planning, petitioned for a
family court order of protection despite her expressed fear of Victor's
reaction to its service, and subsequently dropped her petition.66
In the spring of 2001, Victor was once again arrested, this time,
for throwing a bowl at Angela with such force that she required
emergency medical attention to her arm.67 When Angela did not
appear for trial,68 despite having been served with a subpoena, the
case was dismissed.69
About a year later, in May 2002, Angela left a tearful message
for the prosecutor who had handled the previous case.70 In the
message, she "requested information about how to contact a woman
who had helped her in the past but whose number she no longer had
because the defendant had taken all of her papers."71 Angela added
that the defendant had again "put his hands on me-he just 'went off'
this morning and he's been doing this for a couple of days and I don't
call the cops because I don't have the Order of Protection in my
hand. '72 After filing a report with the police, Angela met with the
prosecutor and recounted multiple incidents of recent abuse, each of
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *8.
68. The case was first scheduled to be tried in December 2001. At that time, Angela,
while expressing her reluctance to testify, was convinced that "because of the on-going
nature of the abuse, it would be best if she did testify against the defendant." Id. at *8.
The case was adjourned for trial to early 2002 because no courts or judges were available.
Id.; see also Lininger, supra note 6, at 815-16 (recognizing that the loss of a victim's
testimony is a frequent consequence of trial delay, and proposing the creation of special
"domestic violence courts" with lighter dockets and the amendment of "speedy trial"
legislation to mandate "substantial showing of urgency" before the adjournment of
domestic violence cases).
69. Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *8. At this point, the case had been transferred to
a new assistant district attorney. The previous assistant had prosecuted all former cases
involving Victor and Angela in conformance with the general practice of the Manhattan
District Attorney's Office with respect to domestic violence cases. Id. Since 1996, Angela
had apparently been in touch with the previous assistant "approximately once a year
either calling for help or to make a new complaint against the defendant." Id.
70. Id. at *9.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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which violated an outstanding family court order of protection.73
Angela "expressed reluctance" to testify in front of the grand jury,
explaining that "she was ashamed to tell her story in front of other
people, she didn't want them to judge her, and she was concerned
that the defendant would be there."74 Ultimately she was convinced
to testify and-after she "froze" at the door to the grand jury-
Angela was able to describe Victor's most recent physical abuse.7"
The grand jury indicted Victor for multiple counts of criminal
contempt.76
Shortly after Victor's arrest, Angela began expressing her desire
to "drop all the charges. '77  She left repeated messages for the
prosecutor, explaining that "things are very hard for me as a single
parent right now ... and ... I cannot work full time because I have no
one to take care of [my daughter]."78 She indicated that the assistant
had "protected ... and help[ed]" her when it was needed, but added
that Victor "doesn't deserve jail time, so, he went into himself to
think, he already has. ' 79 Angela also suggested that the two had not
been in contact since his arrest80 and reiterated her wish that charges
be dismissed.8"
I tell the story of Angela and Victor-or what we know of it from
the relatively few times Angela reached out to law enforcement to
protect her from an ongoing pattern of systemic abuse82-with a
73. Id. At this meeting, Angela also indicated that sometime in the previous four
months the defendant had actually been arrested for violating the order of protection. Id.
This case (which was assigned to a different assistant) had been dismissed due to Angela's
failure to cooperate with the prosecution. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The top count, or most serious charge, contained in the indictment was
aggravated criminal contempt, which makes it a felony to intentionally or recklessly cause
physical injury to a person in violation of a duly served order of protection. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 215.52 (McKinney 2002). Victor was also indicted for two counts of criminal
contempt in the first degree, which prohibits a defendant from engaging in a defined
course of conduct violative of a duly served order of protection. Id. § 215.51.
77. Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *10.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. ld. This contention, frequently articulated by battered women to prosecutors in
support of requests to "drop charges," is highly unlikely. Angela made similar assertions
that were rejected as incredible by the judge later called upon to determine whether
Victor had forfeited his constitutional right to challenge the admissibility of Angela's out-
of-court statements. Id. at *2.
81. Id.
82. According to the Justice Department, women who are victims of domestic abuse
report the violence to law enforcement only fifty-five percent of the time; this number is
even lower when the victim is not physically injured. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
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purpose, and the details here matter. To glimpse this relationship-
and the frustrated involvement of police and prosecutors over six
years-is to begin to understand what those who work with battered
women experience as a matter of course, and those who do not often
fail to appreciate: the general inadequacy of the criminal justice
system to protect victims of domestic violence and hold batterers
accountable. The story of Angela and Victor is tragic, not only
because it tells of torture, but because it is typical. 3
As Angela's ambivalent relationship with the criminal justice
system and its actors reveals, a batterer's conduct often causes the
expressed interests of victims and law enforcement to diverge.'M A
battered woman85 may manifest her reluctance to cooperate with
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE
REDESIGNED SURVEY 5 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
femvied.pdf; see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Comm'n on Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence
Facts and Statistics, http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
("Only about one-seventh of all domestic assaults come to the attention of the police."
(citing FLA. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE,
FLORIDA MORTALITY REVIEW PROJECT 3 (1997))).
83. See Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay
Exceptions To Admit Domestic Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2002) (citing the estimate of the head of the
Los Angeles District Attorney's Office Family Violence Division that 90% of domestic
violence victims recant); Lininger, supra note 6, at 768 ("[R]ecent evidence suggests that
80 to 85 percent of battered women will recant at some point .... ).
84. I do not mean to deny that factors other than the dynamics of abuse may
contribute to a victim's hesitation to cooperate with law enforcement efforts; indeed, the
relationship between these factors and the battering itself is often synergistic. See, e.g.,
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) ("Women of color are often
reluctant to call the police, a hesitancy likely due to a general unwillingness among people
of color to subject their private lives to the scrutiny and control of a police force that is
frequently hostile. There is also a more generalized community ethic against public
intervention, the product of a desire to create a private world free from the diverse
assaults on the public lives of racially subordinated people.").
85. In the vast majority of cases, women are the victims of domestic violence and men
the perpetrators. Approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of heterosexual partner
violence reported to law enforcement is perpetrated by men. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 2 (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf; PHYSICAL ASSAULTS BY
HUSBANDS: A MAJOR SOCIAL PROBLEM, CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE 89-90 (R.J. Gelles & D.R. Loeske eds., 1993). I therefore use the female
pronoun when referring to victims of intimate partner violence and the male pronoun
when referring to its perpetrators. It should also be noted that the terminology used to
describe victims of battering "raises critical questions of definitions and strategy."
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 61 (2000); see
Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 960 n.5 ("[U]se [of] the terms 'battered woman' and
'victim' ... emphasize the basic proposition that women are indeed harmed by
battering.").
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prosecutorial efforts in any number of ways:8 6  she may recant her
allegations,87 refuse to testify,88 effectively disappear,"9 or simply
articulate her desire not to "press charges."9 The true reasons for her
reluctance may or may not be revealed. Domestic violence
prosecutors9' hear from victims that they fear greater violence if they
cooperated;92 that they still love the batterer 93 and do not want him to
86. While commentators generally refer simply to the "reluctant victim," it is helpful
to disaggregate the ways in which she may evidence her reluctance-particularly because
the impact on the prosecution varies tremendously depending on which path of
noncooperation a victim takes.
87. As one expert witness for the prosecution testified in a case involving a recanting
victim:
Domestic violence victims, after describing the violence to the police, often later
repudiate their description. There is typically "anywhere between 24 and 48 hours
where victims will be truthful about what occurred because they're still angry,
they're still scared." But "after they have had time to think about it ... it is not
uncommon for them to change their mind." About 80 to 85 percent of victims
"actually recant at some point in the process." Some victims will say they lied to
the police; almost all will attempt to minimize their experience.
People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004) (quoting testimony of Jeri Darr, Program
Manager of the Antelope Valley Domestic Violence Council). A recanting domestic
violence victim may be called by either the prosecution (who would treat her as a hostile
witness and proceed to cross-examine her testimony) or the defense.
88. See, e.g., People v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 164-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (the
victim refused to testify because the defendant threatened her with physical harm), review
granted, 105 P.3d 114 (Cal. 2005). A victim who refuses to testify despite having been
served with a subpoena may be prosecuted for contempt. See, e.g., John Riley, Spouse-
Abuse Victim Jailed After No-Drop Policy Invoked, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 4
(discussing a case in Anchorage, Alaska in which a victim was jailed for failing to testify);
infra note 314 (citing the use of material witness orders to arrest domestic violence
victims).
89. See, e.g., Heard v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-CA-002494-MR, 2004 WL 1367163,
at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004) (noting that the domestic violence victim disappeared
and did not respond to multiple subpoenas to testify at the trial of her abuser); State v.
Davis, 64 P.3d 661,666 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003), affd, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
90. Prosecutors may, of course, attempt to persuade a reluctant victim to cooperate;
this effort is greatly enhanced by the provision of social services and support specifically
addressed to the needs of battered women. In the event that a victim remains
uncooperative, prosecutors have limited options available: they may subpoena her to
testify (and hope for compliance), determine to move forward without her testimony
where an evidence-based prosecution is viable, or dismiss the charges. See Hanna, supra
note 2, at 1853-54; supra note 3 (discussing prosecutorial policies addressing the
uncooperative victim).
91. For five years I prosecuted domestic violence cases in the New York County
District Attorney's Office. During my last year in the office, in my capacity as domestic
violence supervisor, I assembled a more complete picture of the hundreds of domestic
violence cases handled every month by the office.
92. Sadly, this concern is often well founded. At least one study shows that, while
police involvement may help to reduce violence in the short term, it can increase violence
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suffer; that they need his financial support;94 and that they want their
children to have a father in the home.95 Many other factors may
contribute to a victim's hesitation to participate in the prosecution of
in the long term. Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 43-49 (Eve S.
Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
93. In evaluating the expression of love for their abusers that battered women often
articulate to prosecutors, it is helpful to understand the "cycle of violence" that
characterizes many battering relationships. It "consists of a tension-building phase,
followed by acute battering of the victim, and finally by a contrite phase where the
batterer's use of promises and gifts increases the battered woman's hope that violence has
occurred for the last time." Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to
Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1191, 1208 (1993). As Mary Ann Dutton explains, "[slome batterers are genuinely
remorseful and experience guilt and negative self-image as a result of their violent
behavior, whereas others may use promises and gifts in a more overt act of manipulation."
Id. at 1208 n.89. In either scenario, a pending prosecution inevitably intensifies the effects
of the "contrition" phase of the abusive cycle.
Even apart from this dynamic, however, a battered woman's love for her abuser
should not be abstracted from the complexity of human relationships. As Sarah Buel has
insightfully noted:
A victim may say she still loves the perpetrator, although she definitely wants the
violence to stop. Most people will be in an abusive relationship at some point in
their lives, be it with a boss or family member who mistreats them. However, most
do not immediately leave the job or stop loving the family member when treated
badly; they tend to try harder to please the abuser, whether because they need or
love the job or the person, or hope that renewed effort and loyalty will result in
cessation of the abuse. Since many batterers are charismatic and charming during
the courtship stage, victims fall in love and may have difficulty in immediately
altering their feelings with the first sign of a problem.
Sarah Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A. Why Abuse Victims Stay, COLO. LAW., Oct.
1999, at 19, 22.
94. This problem is particularly acute when the victim is also a mother. See Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 680-81
(2006) ("[S]ingle mothers tend to live at or below the poverty line, and welfare reform has
only served to worsen their plight. Faced with the prospect of living without sufficient
food or shelter for themselves and their child or children, it is not surprising that many
women 'choose' to remain in a relationship with a man who can help to provide these
subsistence items--even if the cost of the exchange is continued violence." (citations
omitted)).
95. The prospect of raising children alone is daunting for many reasons. Many
domestic violence victims "believe it is in the children's best interest to have both parents
in the home, particularly if the abuser does not physically assault the children." Buel,
supra note 93, at 20. The explicit promotion of marriage and family and the denigration of
childrearing "outside of marriage" have resulted in the "demonization of single mothers"
in public discourse. Tuerkheimer, supra note 94, at 682. Battered mothers contemplating
cooperation with prosecutorial efforts must "confront not only adverse material
consequences, but a societal message that many have internalized: children raised in
households headed by single mothers are damaged emotionally, developmentally, and
financially." Id. at 683.
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her abuser. 6  What can be said of virtually every consideration
militating against cooperation, however, is that each is rooted in the
continuing relationship between the woman and the defendant. The
victim's decisionmaking with regard to prosecution simply cannot be
evaluated without reference to the context in which she remains
embedded.
Despite the criminal law's preoccupation with physical injury,97
victims of domestic violence experience a spectrum of violence
defined by both physical and nonphysical manifestations of power
and control.98 As psychologist Mary Ann Dutton explains:
Abusive behavior does not occur as a series of discrete events.
Although a set of discrete abusive incidents can typically be
identified within an abusive relationship, an understanding of
the dynamic of power and control within an intimate
relationship goes beyond these discrete incidents. To negate
the impact of the time period between discrete episodes of
serious violence-a time period during which the woman may
never know when the next incident will occur, and may
continue to live with ongoing psychological abuses-is to fail to
recognize what some battered women experience as a
continuing "state of siege."99
This "state of siege" is often experienced by victims as the most
painful aspect of battering, °00 and it is enduring: the intervention of
law enforcement rarely puts a final end to the power that a batterer
maintains over his victim; rather, it can provide her with a temporary
reprieve from the physical violence.'0'
96. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 64 P.3d 661, 666 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the
defendant threatened the complainant that her children would be removed from her
custody if she testified), affd, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). See generally Buel, supra note
93.
97. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 971-73.
98. As Elizabeth Schneider has noted, an accurate description of battering is
"premised on an understanding of coercive behavior and of power and control-including
a continuum of sexual and verbal abuse, threats, economic coercion, stalking, and social
isolation-rather than 'number of hits.'" ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN
AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 65 (2000).
99. Dutton, supra note 93, at 1208 (quoting Sue Osthoff, Director, National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women).
100. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2123-24 (1993). For a fuller discussion of
the dynamics of battering, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 962-69.
101. Studies have found that, on average, it takes a woman eight years from the time
she first endeavors to leave her abuser, and seven attempts, before she finally separates
from him. A. Horton & B. Johnson, Profile and Strategies of Women Who Have Ended the
Abuse, 74 FAM. IN SOC'Y: J. CONTEMP. HUM. SERVS. 481,481-92 (1993); Mayumi Waddy,
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We see, then, why victimless prosecution is an issue whose
importance to those concerned about domestic violence can hardly be
overstated.1 02 Law enforcement can (and should) continue to
improve its treatment of domestic violence victims;"°3 the law can (and
should) evolve to more accurately define the harm of battering; 1°4 but
a true understanding of what battering entails exposes the intractable
nature of the problem. The uncooperative complainant inheres in the
dynamics of abuse; she is not going away.
II. HEARING A "CRY FOR HELP" AFTER CRAWFORD
After Crawford, the classification of a hearsay statement as
"testimonial" subjects it to a new constitutional scrutiny that is
qualitatively more rigorous than that given to statements deemed
nontestimonial" It is worthwhile to consider the extent to which
DVRO: Just a Piece of Paper, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 81, 83 (2000). Moreover,
"[a]t the moment of separation or attempted separation-for many women, the first
encounter with the authority of law-the batterer's quest for control often becomes most
acutely violent and potentially lethal." Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1991) (defining the
concept of "separation assault" to mean the "assault on a woman's body and volition that
seeks to block her from leaving, retaliate for her departure, or forcibly end the
separation"). Women who separate from their husbands are three times more likely to be
further abused by those spouses than divorced women and twenty-five times more likely
to be victimized by spouses than married women who are still living with their spouses.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 82, at 4.
102. Other scholars have addressed the theoretical and policy implications of victimless
domestic violence prosecution, see, e.g., Hanna, supra note 2, as well as the evidentiary
challenges that most often arise in these cases, see, e.g., Beloof & Shapiro, supra note 83;
Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances To Prosecute Domestic Violence in New York:
The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 171 (2002); Audrey
Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: From
Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67 (1998).
103. See, e.g., Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth:
Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive
Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 125 (1991); Deborah Epstein, Effective
Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges and
the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 13-16 (1999).
104. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 1019-23.
105. The central holding of Crawford is that "[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue
... the Sixth Amendment demands ... unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); see also Richard D.
Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 241 (2005)
(stating that the Confrontation Clause "poses little if any obstacle" to admission of
nontestimonial hearsay).
Crawford left unresolved the extent to which the Roberts reliability approach to
confrontation continues to govern the admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay. See, e.g.,
Mosteller, supra note 10, at 515; Raeder, supra note 18, at 320-35. After Davis, it seems
more likely that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial statements and that
Roberts has been effectively overruled. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274
2006] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
victimless domestic violence prosecutions that would have been
viable before Crawford10 6 are now doomed.107 This of course depends
on whether courts classify as "testimonial" out-of-court statements
that otherwise would be admissible pursuant to applicable evidentiary
rules,18 a matter of considerable complexity.
As the Crawford majority readily conceded, the opinion made no
"effort to spell out a comprehensive definition" of the term, 109 leaving
lower courts to discern its meaning from the Court's "cryptic clues."' 110
(2006) (noting that testimonial hearsay "mark[s] out not merely the [the Confrontation
Clause's] core, but its perimeter"). The less than definitive nature of the Court's
proclamation, however, has led to early divergence in lower court treatment of Roberts's
continued vitality. Compare United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006)
with United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 665 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that
"nontestimonial hearsay is not subject to the confrontation clause" according to that
court's interpretation of Davis).
106. Even before the Court announced its testimonial approach to the Confrontation
Clause, many cases with uncooperative victims could not go forward. Indeed, in the
absence of sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
prosecutors must drop charges. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-3.9 (1993) ("A prosecutor should
not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges
in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.").
107. For purposes of the discussion in Part 1I, I am deferring consideration of the
forfeiture by misconduct exception to Crawford's requirement of witness unavailability
and an opportunity for cross-examination. See infra Part III.
108. With rare exception, victimless prosecutions are based in part on the admission of
hearsay pursuant to an exception to the rule against hearsay. See supra note 102
(referencing evidence commonly used in victimless prosecutions). In the domestic
violence context, most post-Crawford challenges to hearsay are directed at statements to
911 operators or police officers who respond to the crime scene-statements previously
admissible as excited utterances or present sense impressions. See Raeder, supra note 18,
at 332; infra note 150 (noting hearsay exceptions invoked in Davis and its consolidated
companion case, Hammon v. Indiana).
109. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Court left "for another day"
the articulation of a definition of testimonial, provoking Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was
joined by Justice O'Connor, to object that
the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors
need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of "testimony" the Court lists, is
covered by the new rule. They need them now, not months or years from now.
Rules of criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the country,
and parties should not be left in the dark in this manner.
Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The Court in Davis v.
Washington recently elaborated further on its definition of testimonial. See infra notes
151-52 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of testimonial).
110. Holland, supra note 16, at 282. According to the Crawford Court,
[ain accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance
does not. The constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law
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In Crawford's wake, courts have applied a range of definitions to
decide the threshold question,"' often confronting similar factual
scenarios yet reaching divergent conclusions about the testimonial
nature of the challenged statements, and engaging in reasoning as
varied as the tests ostensibly framing the inquiry." 2 A survey of the
post-Crawford case law reflects, to be generous, a state of
confusion."3
In Davis v. Washington"4 and its consolidated companion case,
Hammon v. Indiana, the Court purported to clarify the applicable
legal standard for classifying hearsay." 5  As we shall see,
notwithstanding its seemingly unequivocal definitional language,"
6
the opinion provides little in way of guidance to lower courts or
predictability for litigants."7 Because Davis leaves intact significant
doctrinal indeterminacy, it is crucial to examine how, as a categorical
matter, amorphous legal tests governing what is "testimonial" are
right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type
of out-of-court statement.
The Crawford Court articulated three, oft-cited "formulations" of what it called the "core
class of 'testimonial' statements":
[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable
to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially[;] extrajudicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions[; and] statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). By way of
further explanation, the Court added that "[t]hese formulations all share a common
nucleus and they define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.
Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any definition-for
example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing." Id.
111. See Holland, supra note 16, at 282 (noting the "diversity of judicial decisions
interpreting" the meaning of "testimonial").
112. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text (articulating various definitional
tests).
113. In the period between Crawford and Davis, scholarly discourse focused largely on
the relative merits of the various definitions of "testimonial" floating in the judicial ether.
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 105; Mosteller, supra note 10.
114. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
115. Id. at 2273-74.
116. Id.
117. Given the uniform dissatisfaction expressed by blogging commentators across the
ideological spectrum in the immediate aftermath of Davis, all manner of critique of the
opinion is surely forthcoming. See, e.g., Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSblog, http://
www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/06/18-week/ (Jun. 24, 2006, 18:22 EST).
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judicially mapped onto the realities of battering. Given the Court's
adoption of a definition that is striking for its malleability, the critique
that follows anticipates the prospective factual determinations
confronting lower courts.118 By identifying how misunderstandings of
the dynamics of abuse inform analysis of the definitional question, 19 I
mean to suggest that, however Davis is interpreted, a shift in judicial
thinking about the relevant facts is warranted.2 °
The conceptual tension that underlies this area of law derives
from an uncritical acceptance of what one court expressly termed
"[t]he dichotomy between a plea for help and testimonial
statements." 21  Prior to Davis, regardless of how the definitional
question was precisely framed, this dichotomy was embedded in most
judicial inquiry into the testimonial nature of a statement.12 Whether
courts were examining the declarant's level of excitement,2 3 her
intended use of the statement, 124 her anticipated use of the statement
or a "reasonable person's" anticipated use of the statement,125 the
118. In a sense, reconstructing reality is what Crawford and Davis require of lower
courts. By definition, the doctrinal issues raised by Confrontation Clause challenges are
triggered only when the prosecution has determined to try the defendant without the
testimony of the victim. With rare exceptions, courts deciding whether a statement is
testimonial in nature (or, for that matter, whether the defendant forfeited his
Confrontation Clause rights) do not have the benefit of truthful testimony from a
domestic violence victim. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (suggesting
various ways that victims manifest reluctance to cooperate with prosecution). Engaged in
what might be characterized as an inherently speculative inquiry, judges are called upon to
make factual determinations which are, to a great extent, dependent on their life
experiences, perspectives, and background knowledge with respect to battering. See
Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 974 n.79 (noting the importance of a judicial
"decisionmaker's particular worldview, itself deeply embedded in a social context" and
citing similar feminist critiques of evidence law).
119. For a discussion of the Davis Court's failure to account for these dynamics, see
infra notes 157-96 and accompanying text.
120. To be clear, I am not arguing that hearsay statements by domestic violence victims
cannot be testimonial, see infra note 201 and accompanying text, but, rather, that taking
into account the dynamics of battering will improve judicial reasoning about confrontation
in domestic violence cases.
121. State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
122. See infra notes 123-37.
123. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211-12 (Me. 2004); State v. Forrest, 164
N.C. App. 272, 281, 596 S.E.2d 22, 28 (2004), discretionary review denied, 359 N.C. 193, 607
S.E.2d 653 (2004); In re Key, No. PD-0495-05, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 999 (Tex.
Crim. App. June 29, 2005), reh'g denied, No. 12-04-30-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 9023
(Tex. App. June 29, 2005).
124. See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
125. See, e.g., People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004); Powers, 99
P.3d at 1265.
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degree of "formality" associated with the making of the statement, 26
or even the perspective of the questioner, 127 the issue of exigency
impacted the analysis.
In an important article pre-dating Crawford,1 28 Richard Friedman
and Bridget McCormack describe the operative theoretical
construct 129 as follows:
Now consider statements made in 911 calls and to responding
police officers. A reasonable person knows she is speaking to
officialdom-either police officers or agents whose regular
employment calls on them to pass information on to law
enforcement, from whom it may go to the prosecutorial
authorities. The caller's statements may therefore serve either
or both of two primary objectives-to gain immediate official
assistance in ending or relieving an exigent, perhaps dangerous,
situation, and to provide information to aid investigation and
possible prosecution related to that situation. In occasional
cases, the first objective may dominate-the statement is little
more than a cry for help-and such statements may be
considered nontestimonial .... The more the statement
narrates events, rather than merely asking for help, the more
likely it is to be considered testimonial.130
Friedman and McCormack acknowledge that a speaker may
have a dual purpose in making a statement: she may need "to gain
immediate official assistance in ending or relieving an exigent,
126. See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, No. B164534, 2004 WL 1832719, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 17, 2004); Barnes, 854 A.2d at 211-12.
127. See, e.g., Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 2004), cert denied sub nom.
Mungo v. Greene, 544 U.S. 1002 (2005); Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 814-15
(D.C. 2005), reh'g en banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005); People v. Kilday, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 161, 169-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
128. The "testimonial" approach to confrontation that was advocated by Richard
Friedman for many years was essentially adopted by the Court in Crawford.
129. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1171 (2002). The authors do not limit their discussion to the domestic violence
context, although much of their attention is directed specifically at the problem referred to
as "dial-in testimony" by domestic violence victims, see id. at 1180-1200, most of whom,
according to Friedman and McCormack, "know what they are doing" when they call 911:
They know that by making the call they are practically ensuring that the other
person will be arrested, and that a criminal prosecution will probably follow. We
also believe that in most cases they understand that the prosecutor may attempt to
use the statements they make to the 911 operator or to the police officer who
follows up on the call. In short, these 911 callers realize they are creating evidence
for the prosecution as they call.
Id. at 1199.
130. Id. at 1242.
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perhaps dangerous situation"-which the authors consider "little
more than a cry for help"-and, at the same time, she may intend "to
provide information, to aid investigation and possible prosecution
related to that situation.""13 And yet, even accepting the possibility
that the two motives may coexist, the functions are articulated here-
and similarly understood by lower courts applying Crawford and,
more recently, by the Davis Court-as binary. Put differently, if the
declarant is "providing information to aid investigation," the exigency
confronting her must necessarily have been "end[ed] or reliev[ed],"
and she thus cannot possibly be "cry[ing] for help." '132
In the domestic violence context, this dichotomy is false. Often,
a battered woman's safety depends entirely on the intervention of law
enforcement: she needs police protection because, without
assistance, the violence will continue.'33 To posit a clean divide
between the crime and the exigency it creates, and the crime's
aftermath, is to import a model of crime characterized by discrete
instances of one-time, episodic violence.
As we have seen, this conventional paradigm is incompatible
with the realities of battering.' A domestic violence victim's safety
may be wholly contingent on her communication with police, her
"narration of events" linked inexorably to resolving-however
temporarily-the danger posed by her batterer' Unlike victims of
discrete crimes, a battered woman may "cry for help" because it is the
only possible way for her to experience a moment of safety, however
brief.
The "cry for help" may sound, then, much like a narration of
events because it is: a victim is describing battering that will, in all
likelihood, continue in the absence of some action by law
131. Id.
132. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 129, at 1242.
133. From the perspective of many domestic violence victims, a batterer's abusive
course of conduct is ongoing, notwithstanding interruption by contact with the criminal
justice system. See infra notes 136-38.
134. See infra notes 136-39. For cases that effectively illustrate the ongoing nature of
battering, see, e.g., State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846-47 (Wash. 2005), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006); People v. Walker, 697 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), leave to appeal
granted, 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); State v. Bradley, 799 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474-75 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005), leave to appeal granted, 843 N.E.2d 1160 (2005); People v. Adams, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 237, 238-41 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), depublished by 19 Cal. Reptr. 3d 824 (Cal.
2004); People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004); People v. Kilday,
No. A099095, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 6289, at *4-9 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004).
135. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 806 (Minn. 2005) (en banc), vacated 126
S. Ct. 2979 (2006).
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enforcement.'36 From her perspective, if she does not describe the
crime to police, it is simply not "over," nor is she safe.'37 And even
when she does recount the incident, assuming the police are able to
make an arrest, of course, there is every reason to believe that-after
a respite-the battering will continue. 138  The domestic violence
victim's exigency extends beyond what might appear to an outside
observer, or even to the "reasonable person" unfamiliar with the
culture of the particular battering relationship,'39 to be the "end" of
136. The ongoing pattern of physical and nonphysical conduct that characterizes
battering is often escalated by the victim's attempt to increase her control over her life. In
my prosecutorial experience, I found this to be especially true of acts triggering the
intervention of law enforcement. See Waddy, supra note 101, at 84; cf Brief for National
Network To End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7,
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (Nos. 05-5224 & 05-5705) ("Pursuing
prosecution, thus, is not only an assertion of autonomy, it directly defies the abuser's
control, exposing the victim to considerable risk of violence."). By asserting that violence
will likely continue absent some action on the part of law enforcement, I do not mean to
suggest that arrest will, in all or even most cases, bring about a permanent cessation of
violence. See infra note 138 (acknowledging uncertainty regarding the deterrent effects of
arrest in domestic violence cases). Rather, arrest provides battered women a reprieve,
however temporary, that is of value for a variety of reasons.
137. See, e.g., Brief for National Network To End Domestic Violence, supra note 136,
at 25 n.20 ("It is not uncommon for domestic abusers to threaten their victims that they
will kill them if they call the police." (citing the Director of the Milwaukee County District
Attorney's Office)).
138. Domestic violence victims are rarely (if ever) able to predict with certainty the
impact of a particular call for help on future abuse. Indeed there is considerable
controversy regarding the deterrent effects of arrest in battering relationships. See, e.g.,
Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, The Scientific Evidence Is Not Conclusive: Arrest Is No
Panacea, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 337, 337-56 (Richard J.
Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993); Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?:
Analysis and Policy Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 929, 963 (1994); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 98, at 184-88 (discussing the
broader implications of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies).
Accepting as a phenomenological matter that a constant danger characterizes the
lives of many battered women does not mean that the period of exigency relevant to
Confrontation Clause analysis should be considered to extend indefinitely. As is true of
most difficult criminal law questions, lines must be drawn. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime
and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 274 (2002)
("[T]here are many line-drawing dilemmas throughout the criminal law.").
139. See Fischer, supra note 100, at 971-73. Even if an "objective witness" or
"reasonable person" analysis requires judicial consideration of "an objective witness in the
same category of persons as the actual witness,"-a notion rejected by some courts, see,
e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)-in the domestic
violence realm, either formulation may be problematic. Compare id. (evaluating based
upon an "objective observer"), with State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. App.
2005), discretionary review granted, No. A03-301, 2005 Minn. LEXIS 165 (Minn. Mar. 29,
2005), affid en banc, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 2006) (evaluating based upon a "reasonable
child of [the victim's] age"). After Davis, the way in which these issues are framed may
have shifted: the focus of inquiry would now seem to be on the "circumstances objectively
indicating... the primary purpose of the interrogation," although "it is in the final analysis
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the criminal incident. The exigency the victim experiences requires a
narration of past events in order to resolve the immediate danger
they precipitated. In short, the meaning of "exigency" to a victim of
domestic violence is different than it is to victims of other types of
crime. This reality fatally undermines judicial reasoning predicated
on the "crying for help" versus "providing information to law
enforcement" rubric.
People v. Ruiz 4 ' represents a common mode of judicial analysis.
Decided in the period between Crawford and Davis, the case
provides a helpful illustration of the distortion that results from
conceptually differentiating actually intertwined functions. In Ruiz,
the defendant's conviction for "ex-felon possessing a firearm" was
reversed based on the trial court's admission of an on-scene statement
to a responding police officer. 4 ' The victim, G. Sanchez, informed
the officer that her boyfriend had just threatened her with a gun
during an argument.'42 She indicated that the defendant had "become
angry, grabbed her by the arm"'43 and hair, "pulled a black handgun
from his waistband and had said, 'if you call the cops, I'm going to kill
you in front of them' " Conceding that the police officer's
"function was partially to rescue" Sanchez, the court concluded that
"the complained-of conduct," to wit, brandishing a weapon during an
argument, "was illegal and so dangerous that Sanchez reasonably was
aware that her complaint to the officers would lead to [Ruiz's] arrest
and prosecution." '145
According to the Ruiz court, and others whose opinions rest on
similarly faulty conceptual foundations, 46 the more egregious the
the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions" that remain at the heart of the
Confrontation Clause. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1.
140. No. B169642, 2004 WL 2383676 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2004).
141. The victim did not testify at trial and her "unavailab[ility]," id. at *1, was not
challenged by the defense. Id. at *2-3.
142. A gun was subsequently recovered from the defendant's car approximately ten
minutes after the officers arrived at the scene. Id. at *1.
143. The responding police officer "observed bruises on Sanchez's arm." Id. at *3.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *9.
146. See, e.g., State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. 2004). In Powers, a woman named
"T.P. called 911 to report that [Jeffrey] Powers had been in her home in violation of a no-
contact order" issued on her behalf. Id. at 1263. At the time, Powers had been convicted
of two previous no-contact violations, id., suggesting that T.P. was the victim of a pattern
of abusive conduct at the time she called 911 in this case. The appellate court reversed the
defendant's conviction, concluding that the 911 tape of the call was testimonial and,
therefore, that its admission violated the defendant's confrontation right. id. at 1266-67.
This conclusion was based on the court's characterization of the 911 call: "the content of
T.P.'s call is to report a crime ... but nowhere is it a call for help." Id. at 1265 (emphasis
2006]
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incident, the less the likelihood that a victim is providing information
to police in order to get help.' a This approach thus results in the
exclusion of those statements that reveal most powerfully how the
two functions-"crying for help" and "providing information"-are,
in domestic violence cases, intertwined. From Sanchez's perspective,
it seems quite reasonable to believe that had she not given an account
to the police officer who responded to the scene, the police would
have taken no action to protect her and, as a result, Ruiz would have
resumed his assault on her. Sanchez's fear and her immediate need
for physical protection, however, are not understood by the court to
bear on her motive for providing information to police. When a
victim is in need of police action to confront the danger presented by
her batterer-a danger that, given the continuing nature of the
violence, is no less "exigent" simply because one prosecutable crime
has already occurredl 4 -- the narrative of events necessary to trigger
law enforcement assistance is classified as testimonial hearsay.
Rather than reject the reasoning that relies on these inapt
constructs, the Supreme Court recently reified it in Davis.4 9 At issue
in the case (and in the consolidated case of Hammon v. Indiana) was
the admissibility of various out-of-court statements made by victims
of domestic violence to law enforcement officers during, or
immediately after, an incident of acute physical violence: in Davis,
Michelle McCrotty spoke with a 911 operator about the crime; in
Hammon, Amy Hammon relayed information to a responding police
added). Despite the known history of the defendant's repeated violations of orders to stay
away from T.P.-and in seeming contradiction to references in the tape transcript stating
that T.P. sounded "distressed" and that she and a child were crying during the call, id. at
1265 n.4, the court concluded that the call was actually not "a request for help":
"[i]nstead, the records shows that T.P. called 911 to report Powers' violation of the
existing protective order and described Powers to assist in his apprehension and
prosecution, rather than to protect herself or her child from his return." Id. at 1266. The
court thus concluded that the defendant's confrontation right required exclusion of T.P.'s
statement, id., as other courts have done in similar situations, see, e.g., People v. Adams, 16
Cal. Rptr. 3d 237. 243 (Cal App. 2004), depublished by 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 824 (Cal. 2004);
People v. Kilday, No. A099095, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 6290, at *22-24 (Cal. Ct. App. June
30, 2004); People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), appeal denied, 830
N.E.2d 8 (2005).
147. Thus, somewhat perversely, a victim's report of conduct that is, in the Ruiz court's
view, particularly "dangerous" is more likely to be deemed testimonial (and, thus,
inadmissible) should the victim ultimately choose not to cooperate with prosecutors
because, let us suppose, she is particularly concerned about what her particularly
dangerous batterer will do to her.
148. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text; supra notes 133-39 and
accompanying text. Indeed, given the escalating nature of domestic violence, when one
crime has just occurred, a victim's circumstances may be even more "exigent."
149. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276-78 (2004).
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officer at the scene. In each case, trial proceeded without the
testimony of the victim, the out-of-court statements were admitted
pursuant to a hearsay exception,15° and the defendants were
convicted.5
According to Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, a statement
is nontestimonial if uttered "in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. 15 2  Conversely, if the "primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
to later criminal prosecution"-i.e., if there is "no such ongoing
emergency"-a resulting statement is testimonial.153
Adopting this binary standard, the Court affirmed in Davis,
holding that the "primary purpose" of the 911 call "was to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency," '54 but it reversed in
Hammon, classifying the challenged statements to responding police
as "part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct." '55 By
totemically incanting the language of crisis-"ongoing emergency,"
"imminent danger,". "call for help against bona fide physical threat,"
"present emergency," "frantic answers," "environment that was not
... safe"-the Court purports to differentiate Michelle McCrotty's
words from Amy Hammon's and to justify its definition of the latter
as testimonial. 56 Because "Amy's statements were neither a cry for
help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately
to end a threatening situation,"'57 their admission at trial constituted a
violation of the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.'58
150. The statements in both cases were admitted as excited utterances. State v. Davis,
111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005) (en banc), affd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); Hammon v. State,
829 N.E.2d 444, 448 (2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); see also supra note 108
(characterizing "excited utterance" and "present sense impression" as the most commonly
invoked hearsay exceptions in victimless domestic violence prosecutions).
151. Davis was convicted of felony violation of a domestic no-contact order, Davis, 126
S. Ct. at 2271, and Hammon of domestic battery and probation violation, id. at 2273.
152. Id. at 2273. Somewhat surprisingly, the Court seems to have adopted a test that
focuses on the police officer's primary purpose in conducting the "interrogation," as
opposed to examining the declarant's motivation for speaking to the officer. See supra
notes 123-27 and accompanying text (describing pre-Davis interpretations of testimonial
statements formulated by lower courts). I leave to others the task of exploring this turn.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2277.
155. Id. at 2278.
156. Id. at 2276-78.
157. Id.
158. The Court, however, left open the possibility of a forfeiture finding on remand.
See id. at 2280 ("We have determined that, absent a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing,
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Passage of an "event" thus becomes one proxy for the resolution
of exigency. Yet tensions within the opinion regarding what counts as
an "event" are left unresolved by the majority's unwillingness to
concede that the concept is subject to interpretation. The Court leaps
to an analysis premised on whether the "event" is past or present-
without pausing to consider what must have passed for a statement to
be considered testimonial. In this way, the Court's employment of a
seemingly neutral term ("event") functions to conceal its outcome-
determining effect. The assumption that "events" have either
happened or "are actually happening" obscures the utter subjectivity
of this determination, begging the question of what qualifies as an
",event."'59
If "event" were defined in this context as narrowly as possible-
i.e., as the infliction of physical injury-it might be possible to identify
when an event had concluded. While a number of passages in the
opinion suggest that the Court is flirting with adopting this constricted
view (by references to "past criminal events" and the like1"), it
ultimately concludes, as it must, that "event" should be defined more
broadly, at the very least, to encompass "a threatening situation"'' or
"ongoing emergency. '' 62 After all, Davis had already left the home
moments before McCrotty described the assault to the 911
operator.163 Yet somehow, the Court is able to view her as "speaking
about events as they were actually happening."'" 6
An expansive understanding of what constitutes an "event"-
and not the crabbed, episodic notion that the Court seems at times to
embrace-is particularly warranted in the battering context. The
ongoing pattern of physical and nonphysical conduct that is domestic
violence is often escalated by the victim's attempt to increase her
control over her life; this is especially true of acts triggering the
intervention of law enforcement. 165  Accordingly, a meaningful
the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammon's affidavit. The Indiana courts
may (if they are asked) determine on remand whether such a claim of forfeiture is
properly raised and, if so, whether it is meritorious.").
159. Id. at 2276.
160. Id. at 2278.
161. Id. at 2279.
162. Id. at 2273.
163. Id. at 2271; Davis v. Washington, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005), affd, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (2006).
164. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
165. Cf. Brief for National Network To End Domestic Violence et al., supra note 136
("Pursuing prosecution, thus, is not only an assertion of autonomy, it directly defies the
abuser's control, exposing the victim to considerable risk of violence.").
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definition of event must extend beyond the infliction of physical
injury.
Beyond the ambiguity surrounding the device of "event," Davis
rests on the fallacy that exigency can be discerned without reference
to context. 166 Certainly Michelle McCrotty is more readily analogized
to victims of paradigmatic crime:167 her attacker had just recently
fled,168 while Amy Hammon's was still in the house during the police
166. Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in Davis and dissenting in Hammon,
implicitly incorporates this critique insofar as his opinion contemplates the dynamics of
domestic violence. Consider the following passage:
The fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating Mr. Hammon's past
conduct does not foreclose the possibility that the primary purpose of his inquiry
was to assess whether Mr. Hammon constituted a continuing danger to his wife,
requiring further police presence or action. It is hardly remarkable that Hammon
did not act abusively towards his wife in the presence of the officers ... and his
good judgment to refrain from criminal behavior in the presence of police sheds
little, if any, light on whether his violence would have resumed had the police left
without further questioning, transforming what the Court dismisses as "past
conduct" back into an "ongoing emergency."
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2284-85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Apropos of this observation, the Court's reference to the 1779 English case of
King v. Brasier is curious. See id. at 2277. By suggesting that a young rape victim's
"screams for aid as she was being chased by her assailant" would properly be deemed
nontestimonial, the Court seems willing to consider the possibility that safety-as opposed
to crime currently in progress-is the operative construct. See id. What eludes the Court
is the extent to which the dynamics of domestic violence raise safety concerns that are
distinct from those presented by paradigmatic crime. (While nonmarital rape arguably
departs in certain respects from a conventional crime paradigm, chase by an assailant,
regardless of the crime, is more likely experienced by a victim of paradigmatic crime-i.e.,
someone whose attacker is not an intimate.) A domestic violence victim may, in effect, be
screaming for aid as she is being functionally chased by her assailant, yet, provided the
physical assault has ended, the Court would presumably characterize the statement as one
that described past events and is, therefore, testimonial.
168. In dicta that is both confusing and troubling, Justice Scalia suggests that "after the
operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the
emergency appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises) .... It
could readily be maintained that, from that point on, McCrotty's statements were
testimonial." Id. at 2277. From the complete transcript of the 911 call at issue, it seems
that after "beating [her] up," Davis "ran out the door." Joint Appendix, Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (No. 05-5224), 2005 WL 3617525, at *10, *12. The
Court rightly views this time-after the infliction of physical injury but before Davis has
driven away-as characterized by sufficient exigency to qualify the statements made
during this period as nontestimonial; there was, of course, no reason for McCrotty (or the
911 operator) to believe that Davis would not return to continue his attack. And yet,
Justice Scalia perceives that once Davis has gotten in the car and is driving up the "dead-
end" of a dead-end street, id. at *10, the "emergency appears to have ended." Davis, 126
S. Ct. at 2277. That this moment (the turning of the ignition? the movement of the car?)
becomes the instant at which the exigency confronting Michelle McCrotty vanishes seems
to defy reality-particularly if one imagines how events would likely have unfolded had
police not responded to her need for protection. Although this scenario is counterfactual,
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investigation. But this, of course, does not mean that exigency can be
experienced only as it was by Michelle. Amy's story is not unlike
those of countless battered women unable to communicate with law
enforcement "about events as they [are] actually happening."' 6 9 Yet
the Court's inability (or unwillingness) to contemplate her
perspective allows it to proclaim with certainty: "It is entirely clear
from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an
investigation into possibly criminal past conduct."'7 ° As "[tihere was
no emergency in progress" '71 (apparently because the responding
officer "heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or
break anything" '172) and "there was no immediate threat"'73 once
officers arrived, it is clear to the Court that "the primary, if not
indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a
possible crime."'7 And thus is Amy Hammon "cast ... in the
unlikely role of a witness."'75
Consider an alternative formulation of these same facts and their
legal significance. 7 6  Police respond promptly'77 to a "reported
it is only so in hindsight: at the time of the communication at issue-which is, after all, the
relevant occasion for purposes of determining whether a statement is sufficiently like
testimony to require exclusion-it seems fair to say that, absent police aid, there was still
every reason for McCrotty (and the 911 operator) to believe that Davis would return to
continue his attack.
169. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276. Hershel Hammon apparently broke the telephone
during his attack on his wife. Id. at 2272. For obvious reasons, it is quite common for
batterers to destroy or disable the telephone during episodes of acute physical violence.
Even if a phone is in working order during an attack, it should come as no surprise that
victims are rarely able to make a call to 911 in the midst of a beating.
170. Id. at 2278.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2277. This language comes from the portion of the opinion in which the
Court, rejecting Davis's Confrontation Clause challenge, dismisses the argument that
Michelle McCrotty's statement was testimonial. The Court correctly observes that
McCrotty's "ex parte communication" was not "aligned" with "[its] courtroom
[analogue]," concluding that "[n]o 'witness' goes into court to proclaim an emergency and
seek help." Id.
176. This recitation of the facts is culled from the opinions of the Indiana Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270-74; Hammon v. State, 809
N.E.2d 945, 948-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (2006).
177. According to the Indiana Court of Appeals, "it is reasonable to infer that Officer
Mooney responded promptly to the dispatch after receiving it and he arrived in a timely
manner." Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 949. While the factual record was not well developed
on this point (the officer "did not testify as to the precise amount of time that passed
between his receipt of the domestic disturbance dispatch and the time that he arrived at
the residence," id.), it is unlikely that a more precise account of the timeline would have
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domestic disturbance"' 78 and find a "timid"'79 and "frightened"'' 0
woman, and a man who admits to arguing with his wife 8 ' but claims-
despite a living room in a state of "disarray"'8 12 with "broken objects
littering the ... floor"'83 and shards of glass in front of a shattered gas
heating unit with "flames coming out of the ... partial glass
front""4-that it "never became physical."' 85 After police separate the
two, the woman tells police that her husband had thrown her into the
shattered glass and punched her in the chest and that she is in pain. 8 6
Despite the efforts of police to keep the man away, he makes "several
attempts" to enter the room where the woman is speaking to an
officer about the episode, becoming "angry" when the officer
"insist[s] that [he] stay separated" from his wife so that police can
investigate the situation.8 7
Might a "reasonable listener"'8 8 with insight into the nature of
domestic violence conclude that Amy was not describing events that
were "past" in any meaningful sense of the word?8 9 Rather, she was
changed the outcome in Davis. Nonetheless, lower courts implementing the holding will
now carefully scrutinize the timing of law enforcement's response.
178. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272. The Court's disparate treatment of the 911 call and the
on-scene statements suggests that, somewhat ironically, a battered woman whose abuser
has disabled her mode of phoning the police, see supra note 169, is less likely to be
perceived as confronting an "ongoing danger" when she ultimately communicates with law
enforcement. If her "cry for help" is not telephonic because the batterer has more
effectively preempted it, the cry may well go unheard. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279. 1 say this
notwithstanding a seemingly important concession by the Court-that " '[o]fficers called
to investigate [domestic disputes] ... need to know whom they are dealing with in order to
assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim,' " which "may often mean that 'initial inquiries' produce nontestimonial
statements," id. (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County,
542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)-because of the way in which the Court applies this principle to
the facts of Hammon. See id. ("But in cases like this one, where Amy's statements were
neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to
end a threatening situation, the fact that they were given at an alleged crime scene and
were 'initial inquiries' is immaterial.").
179. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 949.
180. Id.
181. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.
182. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 948.
183. Id. at 949.
184. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.
185. Id.
186. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 948.
187. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272. According to the testimony of the responding police
officer, when her husband approached, Amy became quiet and seemed afraid. Hammon,
809 N.E.2d at 948.
188. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
189. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (critiquing the Court's
employment of "event" as an objectively ascertained phenomenon).
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very much "facing an ongoing emergency."' 9 °  The threat to her
absent some sort of police action in response to her husband's recent
criminal conduct was "bona fide."'' And police needed information
"to be able to resolve the present emergency." '192 Finally, Amy's
answers were "provided ... in an environment that was not tranquil,
or even ... safe."'1 93 (These are, of course, the factors delineated by
the Court in defense of its designation of Michelle McCrotty's 911 call
as nontestimonial.) Yet the Court easily 94 classifies Amy Hammon's
statements as testimonial: unlike Michelle McCrotty, and like Sylvia
Crawford, 95 she was "telling a story about the past,"'196 not "seeking
aid."197
The portion of Davis treating Hammon may well be criticized for
its application of the Court's newly articulated definition to the facts.
But the important point is that Amy Hammon could not "seek aid"
without "telling a story about the past." (After all, police could do
nothing to protect her from her husband were Amy simply to have
requested assistance because she feared him.) My contention,
therefore, is that the Court's test is inherently flawed.' 98 By equating
the past commission of crime (i.e., by propounding the primacy of
tense 99) with the resolution of exigency, the Court wholly discounts
the realities of battering. °°
190. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2277.
194. Id. at 2278 ("Determining the testimonial or nontestimonial character of the
statements that were the product of the interrogation in Hammon is a much easier task.").
195. Sylvia Crawford was the declarant whose statements to police-"made and
recorded while she was in police custody, after having been given Miranda warnings as a
possible suspect"-were deemed testimonial in Crawford. Id.
196. Id. at 2279.
197. Id.
198. The test is inherently flawed insofar as it cannot be applied meaningfully in the
domestic violence realm, though it may indeed be compatible with paradigmatic crime.
The irony is that, as a categorical matter, it is battering prosecutions that (apart from
homicide cases) will most often present the need for trial without the testimony of a
victim. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text. If a framework for Confrontation
Clause challenges fails in these cases, it surely cannot be viewed as coherent. See infra
Conclusion.
199. See, e.g., Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 ("McCrotty's present-tense statements showed
immediacy; Amy's narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from the
danger she described."); supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (critiquing ambiguity
surrounding the Court's use of "event").
200. One way of addressing. the problem I am identifying here would be to define
domestic violence more accurately in the criminal code, that is, to criminalize the ongoing,
patterned exercise of power and control that is battering. I have proposed such a statute
and explained at length the limitations of the current criminal law's incident-based
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After Davis, it seems probable that the "ongoing emergency"
framework will continue to undermine reasoned judicial analysis of
the threshold definitional question. Even were courts to adopt the
contextualized approach that I have suggested is appropriate,211
however, there is undoubtedly hearsay which will be properly defined
as testimonial.2 2 It may be that the discrepancy between what an
evidentiary code requires2°3 and what the testimonial approach to
confrontation demands has grown wider, particularly in the realm of
domestic violence prosecution. Because some theoretical divergence
is inevitable-and because, as a practical matter, the wholesale
judicial rejection of familiar templates seems unlikely-the next
frontier for the victimless prosecution of domestic violence is
forfeiture.
III. FORFEITURE BY MISCONDUCT-THE NEXT FRONTIER
A criminal defendant whose wrongdoing2 4 has procured the
absence of his victim at trial205 is deemed to have forfeited his right of
confrontation. 206  This rule-expressly "approved" by the Court in
physical injury-focused response to domestic violence. See generally Tuerkheimer, supra
note 17, at 1019-30; supra Part II.
201. Contextualizing the testimonial inquiry in the manner I have suggested is
consistent with an approach to the confrontation right that I will describe as "relational."
See infra Conclusion.
202. See supra note 120.
203. When considering the scope of this discrepancy, it is worth noting the recent
expansions of hearsay exceptions often used in victimless pro,;cution. For instance,
"California and Oregon have ad hoc hearsay exceptions directed towards domestic
violence victims" that allow certain statements of a declarant describing "the infliction or
threat of physical injury" against her, provided the statement was "made at or near the
time of the incident." Raeder, supra note 18, at 353; see also CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1370(a)(1), (3) (West Supp. 2006); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.460(26)(a) (2005).
204. "Wrongful conduct obviously includes the use of force and threats, but it has also
been held to include persuasion and control by a defendant, the wrongful nondisclosure of
information, and a defendant's direction to a witness to exercise the fifth amendment
privilege." Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053
(1983). For further discussion of defining wrongdoing in the domestic violence context,
see infra notes 278-307.
205. See infra note 314 (discussing unavailability analysis meaningfully applied to
domestic violence cases).
206. "Some courts speak of the defendant as having waived the confrontation right, but
this is inaccurate: It is not necessarily so that an accused who has acted in the ways
described here has knowingly, intelligently, and deliberately relinquished the right."
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506,
506 n.2 (1997). But see James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed
Exception for "Forfeiture" by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193 (2006).
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both Crawford2 7  and, more recently, Davis----"extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds, ' z 9 precluding
an accused from "complain[ing] about the consequences of his own
conduct. 21 0 A judicial finding of forfeiture results in the admission at
trial of out-of-court statements that would otherwise be excluded
pursuant to the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford's testimonial approach to hearsay-and, more
generally, its "restoration" of Confrontation Clause protection2 1 1 -
instantly creates the prospect of a newly robust forfeiture doctrine
212
as well as providing an impetus for its reenvisioning.1 3 Before
Crawford, the linkage of Confrontation Clause analysis to the
evidentiary rules214 meant that constitutional forfeiture had a
207. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (citing Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878)). The Court's acceptance of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and
state court forfeiture decisions following Crawford, are not without their critics. See, e.g.,
Flanagan, supra note 206. Flanagan argues that a defendant's loss of confrontation rights
should be understood as "based on a waiver or implied waiver rationale" (as opposed to
forfeiture) and posits that an "essentially unrestrained forfeiture theory" is in tension with
equitable norms. Id. at 1196, 1199.
208. See supra note 33 (noting Davis's reiteration of the vitality of forfeiture doctrine).
209. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
210. See Friedman, supra note 206, at 516-18 ("The proper basis for this principle is
not, as some courts have suggested it is, the broad dictum that no one should profit by his
own wrong. As an ideal, that is probably true, but in some cases exclusion of the evidence
on confrontation grounds will not be necessary to guarantee that the accused does not
profit by his own wrong, and in some cases such exclusion will not be sufficient to
guarantee that result . I..." d. at 516.
A more satisfying explanation may be that the accused should not be heard to
complain about the consequences of his own conduct. Thus, the accused ought not
be able to cause exclusion of the secondary evidence on the ground that he has
been unable to confront and examine the declarant when his own conduct
accounts for that inability.
Id. at 517-18.
211. Friedman, supra note 10, at 5.
212. As Myrna Raeder observes, "Crawford virtually invited prosecutors to raise
claims of forfeiture when facing Confrontation Clause challenges." Raeder, supra note 18,
at 361; see supra note 33 (predicting that Davis's imprimatur on forfeiture doctrine will
have dramatic impact on this area of law).
213. In contrast to the abundance of cases treating the testimonial question, see, e.g.,
supra notes 122-27, post-Crawford forfeiture case law is still remarkably undeveloped. In
my view, the discrepancy is reflective of the practical challenge of recalibrating
understandings of the bench and prosecutorial bar with respect to how constitutional
forfeiture applies to domestic violence cases. It also suggests that this is a uniquely
opportune moment for considered reflection on how best to effect forfeiture's normative
potential in a new jurisprudential era. See infra Part III.C (explaining why "forfeiture
must be conceptualized anew").
214. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text (summarizing the pre-Crawford
regime):
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relatively insignificant doctrinal identity of its own.2 15  Despite the
Court's early recognition of a constitutional forfeiture doctrine,2' 6 not
until the latter half of the twentieth century did modern courts begin
systematically using forfeiture theory to address the problem of
witness intimidation. 17 In response to rising concern about the loss of
testimony in organized crime and drug prosecutions, courts began
admitting out-of-court statements of missing witnesses.218  Applying
the residual hearsay exception to address the evidentiary objection, 19
courts held that witness intimidation constituted a forfeiture of the
constitutional right of confrontation.22 °
In 1997, the principle of forfeiture by misconduct was codified in
an evidentiary rule.221 Much of the recent case law treating forfeiture
215. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006) ("The Roberts approach to
the Confrontation Clause undoubtedly made recourse to this doctrine less necessary,
because prosecutors could show the 'reliability' of ex parte statements more easily than
they could show the defendant's procurement of the witness's absence."). Writing in 2003,
one commentator observed that "[a]lthough witness intimidation is a significant problem,
the exception has been an important issue in only about seventy-five reported federal and
state cases." James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in
Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 543 (2003).
216. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the defendant, who
was being retried for bigamy, refused to reveal to law enforcement the whereabouts of his
second wife, who had testified at his first trial. Id. at 159-60. The Court held that the
admission of the absent witness's former trial testimony was proper, concluding that the
defendant had forfeited his right of confrontation. Id. at 160. The Court reasoned:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to
supply the place of that which he has kept away.
Id. at 158.
217. Flanagan, supra note 215, at 465-68. James Flanagan suggests that Reynolds had
"little impact on the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence," noting that
before Crawford, the Court cited Reynolds in only seven cases involving a defendant's loss
of Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 465.
218. Id. at 466.
219. Id. at 467. The residual exception, which was originally found in FED. R. EVID.
803(24) and 804(b)(25), is now codified at FED. R. EVID. 807. The forfeiture by
wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay was not codified in the Federal Rules of
Evidence until 1997. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
220. Flanagan, supra note 215, at 466-69. In James Flanagan's view, the Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence that he summarizes is properly understood as applying waiver
theory. See supra notes 215, 217 (elaborating on Flanagan's position).
221. "A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness" is admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay. FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(6). This exception was added to the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1997; only a few
states to date have specifically amended their codes to include the provision. Lininger,
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accordingly focused on whether this "forfeiture by wrongdoing"
hearsay exception was satisfied. 2  If the evidentiary exception
applied, any remaining challenge to an out-of-court statement on
Confrontation Clause grounds was, until Crawford, framed by the
"reliability" inquiry.223 As articulated by James Flanagan:
Although the exception has been promulgated as a rule of
evidence, it will affect Confrontation Clause claims because the
Supreme Court has linked hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause, and has generally found that exceptions to the rule
against hearsay also satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Now that
Rule 804(b)(6) defines the conditions for the forfeiture of the
hearsay objection, those same conditions will inevitably apply
to the constitutional objections as well. 224
Crawford's transformation of the Confrontation Clause has
fundamentally altered this terrain.25 As a consequence of the Court's
unequivocal decoupling2 26 of the constitutional right from the
supra note 6, at 807. Nonetheless, rule 804(b)(6) may still "affect the states as they
develop their own versions of the Rule," and can potentially be "influential in states
without an evidence code." Flanagan, supra note 215 at 500 n.268.
222. See, e.g., State v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the defendant's
conviction and holding that the unavailable declarant's statements were admissible under
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) due to the defendant's wrongdoing in murdering the declarant);
United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Emery, 186
F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); see also United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that one defendant's wrongdoing in murdering a witness renders that
declarant's statements admissible against all defendants, pursuant to rule 804(b)(6)).
223. Although a Confrontation Clause challenge to testimonial hearsay no longer
necessitates a judicial finding of reliability, a defendant's due process rights may still be
implicated by the admission of unreliable out-of-court statements-even those to which
the defendant forfeited his right to object on Confrontation Clause grounds. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 n.21 (Mass. 2005) ("There may be some
statements so lacking in reliability that their admission would raise due process
concerns."); cf. Raeder, supra note 18, at 362 (observing that in most domestic violence
murder cases, forfeiture arguments are constitutional, rather than evidentiary; "since
forfeiture hearsay exceptions are generally limited to witness tampering ... some other
exception, such as an excited utterance or a catch-all ensures the reliability of the
statement").
224. Flanagan, supra note 215, at 500-01.
225. See Joshua Deahl, Expanding Forfeiture Without Sacrificing Confrontation After
Crawford, 104 MICH. L. REV. 599, 606 (2005) ("Given the new approach to the
Confrontation Clause, overlooking the emerging importance of forfeiture could be a
serious mistake."). Because the problem of the absent witness is endemic to domestic
violence prosecutions, see supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (explaining common
reasons for domestic violence victim's lack of cooperation with prosecution), a vitalized
forfeiture doctrine is likely to have the greatest impact in this type of case.
226. Raeder, supra note 18, at 363.
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evidentiary code,227 constitutional forfeiture must be given its own
doctrinal space.228 Indeed, the dramatically changed approach to the
Confrontation Clause means that forfeiture, too, must be
conceptualized anew.229
The need for this reexamination of forfeiture occasioned by
Crawford's "radical transformation, 23 is, in my view, particularly
critical in the domestic violence context. As I will show, the
traditional forfeiture paradigm, firmly entrenched in legal culture,
does not map onto the realities of battering.23 1  Without an
appreciation of how domestic violence is different from other types of
crime, judicial decisionmaking-which tends to default to reason by
way of precedent and analogy232 -will invariably fall short. 233
Defining the contours of a constitutional forfeiture doctrine with
meaning in the domestic violence realm therefore requires an
evolution in judicial reasoning.
A. Evidentiary Forfeiture and the Problem of Specific Intent
Cases treating evidentiary forfeiture are of limited utility to
courts faced with constitutional forfeiture in domestic violence cases.
Precedent fails because Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6)'s
requirement that the defendant have "intent to procure" the
unavailability of the victim2 would exclude the misconduct that often
causes the trial absence of battered women.23 Before elaborating on
227. When considering the introduction of hearsay statements against a criminal
defendant in a post-Crawford era, it is important to bear in mind that, while evidentiary
admissibility does not dictate constitutionality, neither does constitutional acceptability
resolve evidentiary issues. For a thoughtful proposal to expand admissible hearsay to
facilitate victimless domestic violence prosecution after Crawford, see Lininger, supra note
6, at 797-811. For purposes of this Article, I take no position on the merits of hearsay
reform and assume the continued applicability of the evidentiary framework in place
before Crawford, a framework that, it should be emphasized, allowed some-but certainly
not all-domestic violence prosecutions to go forward in the absence of a cooperative
victim. See supra note 108 (discussing hearsay exceptions commonly utilized in victimless
domestic violence prosecutions).
228. See Raeder, supra note 18, at 363 ("In my view, we need to separate the forfeiture
hearsay exception from the constitutional forfeiture doctrine.").
229. See infra Part III.C.
230. Friedman, supra note 10, at 6.
231. See infra Part III.B.
232. Cf. Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1314 (1991) ("Legal method traditionally proceeds by analogy and distinction.").
233. By "fall short," I mean that in victimless domestic violence prosecutions, the
equitable promise of forfeiture will remain largely unfulfilled. See supra notes 208-09 and
accompanying text (noting the normative underpinnings of forfeiture doctrine).
234. See Flanagan, supra note 206, at 485.
235. See infra notes 239-62 and accompanying text (discussing Ivy).
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this claim, it should be emphasized that judicial interpretation of the
evidentiary rule need not-and should not-be slavishly imported to
the constitutional context.
As the Sixth Circuit (in a case not involving domestic violence)
has recognized:
There is no requirement that a defendant who prevents a
witness from testifying against him through his own wrongdoing
only forfeits his right to confront the witnesses where, in
producing the witness's unavailability, he intended to prevent
the witness from testifying. Though the Federal Rules of
Evidence may contain such a requirement, the right secured by
the Sixth Amendment does not depend on, in the words of the
Supreme Court, "the vagaries of the Rules of Evidence." The
Supreme Court's recent affirmation of the "essentially
equitable grounds" for the rule of forfeiture strongly suggests
that the rule's applicability does not hinge on the wrongdoer's
motive.236
This observation is especially compelling in the battering context,
where a "specific intent 237 requirement is most problematic. 238
The court's reasoning in State v. Ivy239 reveals the incongruity of
conditioning forfeiture on a showing that a domestic violence
defendant intended by his conduct to procure a victim's trial absence.
David Ivy was convicted of the murder of LaKisha Thomas, whom he
had been dating for almost a year.24° Over the course of their
relationship, Ivy engaged in a course of conduct characterized by the
violent exercise of control.241  According to one witness, Thomas
236. United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
237. "Specific intent" refers to a "special mental element which is required above and
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(e) (4th ed. 2003). In the evidentiary forfeiture context,
the defendant must have specifically intended to procure the victim's unavailability.
238. In some domestic violence cases, of course, the defendant does act in a manner
that would satisfy the legal requirement of intent to procure a victim's trial absence. See,
e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 807 (Minn. 2005) (finding that defendant who
menaced his girlfriend with a gun made calls from jail threatening that "if she doesn't do
what he wants someone will come over to her house and do something to her"). Even in
domestic violence cases in which a "specific intent" requirement could similarly be
established, other issues tend to undermine the traditional "witness tampering" paradigm.
See infra notes 300-04 and accompanying text.
239. No. W2003-00786-CCA-R3-DD, 2004 WL 3021146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004 Dec.
30, 2004).
240. Id. at *1-2.
241. Testimony regarding what the court refers to as "instances of conflict in David Ivy
and Lakisha Thomas' relationship" included the following: one witness observed the
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often indicated that "she was ready to leave" the defendant, "but she
was scared. 2
42
Two days before he killed her, Ivy assaulted Thomas with a
pistol.243 When police responded to the scene, Thomas had visible
injuries consistent with her description of events. 2" She told police
that Ivy had "said that he wasn't going back to jail" and "that he
would come back and kill her. 2 45 In the days immediately preceding
her murder, Thomas repeatedly expressed her fear of the defendant:
she told her cousin that Ivy had threatened that "if I put the police in
his business he was going to fuck me up"; according to an employee at
a store to which the defendant followed her, Thomas "was shaking
real bad and crying and saying, 'I know he's going to kill me. I know
he's going to get me.' ,246 This same employee overheard Ivy tell
Thomas that "it wasn't over," and that "[h]e was going to get her. 2 47
Two days later, Ivy shot and killed Thomas from less than two
feet away while she was sitting in a parked car. 48 According to one
witness, before firing, he "smiled and remarked, 'oh, bitch, you want
me dead, huh?' ,249
At trial, the prosecution moved to admit various out-of-court
statements made by Thomas pursuant to the State's forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing hearsay exception. In contrast to many victimless
defendant pull a hair plug out of Thomas's head; another witness "confirmed ... [the
defendant's] physical abuse of Ms. Thomas ... [and] further stated that Ms. Thomas would
comment that [the defendant] 'had her on 23 and 1. She could only come out an hour a
day. That was to take her kids to school and pick them up from school.' " Id. at *4. A
police officer testified that, a month before the murder, he responded to a disturbance at
Thomas's apartment and was informed that the defendant "had forced his way into her
apartment and was moving the belongings out of her apartment" and that he had "stated
that he was going to kill her." Id. Thomas indicated that the defendant "was stalking her
and was constantly making threats to her to harm her and he was upset because she ended
their relationship." Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at *1-2.
244. Id. at *2.
245. Id. at *1.
246. Id. at *3.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *3, *6.
249. Id. at *3.
250. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) provides: "A statement offered against a
party that has engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to and did procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness" constitutes an exception to the rule against
hearsay. In Ivy, the State did not rely on other hearsay exceptions (although at least
certain statements would presumably qualify as excited utterances), Ivy, 2004 WL
3021146, at *15, and, therefore, the court's forfeiture analysis is framed by the evidentiary,
rather than constitutional, law. See supra note 223.
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domestic violence prosecutions, 211 there could be no dispute that the
act allegedly committed by the defendant 252-i.e., murder-
constitutes misconduct, or that it caused the victim's absence. 3
Rather, the appellate court focused on what it viewed as a lack of
proof on the "motive" issue, concluding that the prosecution did not
show that Ivy acted with the requisite intent to procure Thomas's
unavailability.2 4
In determining that the trial court erred in its finding of
forfeiture,255 the appellate court noted that no evidence was presented
that the defendant was aware that a warrant had issued for his arrest
for assault; thus, according to the court, "any finding that [the
defendant] murdered the victim to prevent her from testifying against
him ... is at best speculative., 256  The court seemed to take into
account the dynamics of battering (clearly characteristic of the
relationship between Ivy and Thomas), but-in a cruelly ironic
twist-did so to support its contention that Ivy's threats to kill
Thomas could not be considered proof that her murder was intended,
at least in part,257 to prevent her from testifying against him.25 8 The
court reasoned:
As much as the proof indicated that [the defendant's] intent
was to prevent Ms. Thomas from testifying against him, e.g.,
251. See infra notes 278-305 and accompanying text.
252. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the applicable standard of
proof was preponderance of the evidence. Ivy, 2004 WL 3021146, at *13-14.
253. Notwithstanding this observation, it is worthwhile to imagine how a court would
analyze the forfeiture question if the more likely scenario had come to pass: that is, had
Thomas not been murdered, but, rather, had she become uncooperative in the prosecution
of Ivy for assaulting her with a pistol and been deemed unavailable at trial. See supra note
92 and accompanying text (discussing a domestic violence victim's "choice" not to
prosecute).
254. Ivy, 2004 WL 3021146, at *14.
255. In light of the testimony of two eyewitnesses to Thomas's murder, the court found
the trial court's error in admitting the out-of-court statements harmless. Id. at *15.
256. Id. at *14.
257. Even courts requiring that the defendant intended to procure the victim's trial
absence for a finding of forfeiture recognize that it need not be his sole purpose in acting.
See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The government need
not, however, show that the defendant's sole motivation was to procure the defendant's
absence; rather, it need only show that the defendant 'was motivated in part by a desire to
silence the witness.' " (quoting United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1282 (1st Cir.
1996))).
258. Again, the court was not addressing whether Ivy's conduct in the absence of a
murder might constitute forfeiture, which is-at least in the constitutional forfeiture
context-a question potentially raised by the facts of countless domestic violence
prosecutions. See infra notes 278-305 and accompanying text (discussing paradigmatic
domestic violence "tampering").
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"he wasn't going back to jail" and "he told me if I put the police
in his business he was going to fuck me up," there was also
evidence that Ms. Thomas had endured [Ivy's] abusive behavior
throughout the existence of their relationship. To conclude that
the murder was committed for the purpose of preventing Ms.
Thomas from testifving at potential future proceedinas would
expand the Rule beyond the scope of its intended purpose.25 9
This passage suggests that the applicable forfeiture definition is
fundamentally incompatible with the realities of domestic violence.
Specifically, Ivy's analysis of "specific intent" shows why case law
treating evidentiary forfeiture is not helpful26 ° in formulating a
constitutional forfeiture doctrine with meaning in the battering
context . 61 The problem of specific intent is sufficiently fundamental
in the domestic violence realm to render evidentiary forfeiture
inapposite to a relevant constitutional framework. 62
B. Constitutional Forfeiture and the Limits of the Witness Tampering
Paradigm
If case law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) is not
a useful source of guidance in applying constitutional forfeiture
doctrine to the domestic violence realm, courts may be naturally
inclined-or perhaps institutionally predisposed-to rely on
traditional witness tampering cases263 for their precedential value. 21 I
argue that it would be a mistake to do so. Given the ways in which
battering is qualitatively different from paradigmatic "witness
259. Ivy, 2004 WL 3021146, at *14.
260. Nor, again, is the case law governing evidentiary forfeiture controlling. See supra
note 235 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part III.A (noting limited value of precedent).
262. See State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), cert. granted, 134 P.3d
120 (N.M. 2006). In Romero, which involved a prosecution for the murder of the
defendant's former wife, the appellate court noted its disagreement with state supreme
court precedent holding that proof of Confrontation Clause forfeiture requires the
showing of a specific intent to procure the witness's absence. The intermediate court
remarked, "[W]e suspect that our Supreme Court may not have fully considered the pros
and cons of imposing the intent to silence requirement in all cases involving forfeiture by
wrongdoing." Id. at 854. The New Mexico Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
review the decision and specifically to revisit the boundaries of constitutional forfeiture.
State v. Romero, 113 P.3d 346 (N.M. 2005); E-mail from Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney
Gen., State of N.M., to Deborah Tuerkheimer, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Me. Sch.
of Law (June 29, 2006, 14:31:00 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
263. See supra notes 217-20 (placing judicial treatment of "typical witness
intimidation" cases in historical perspective).
264. See infra note 304 and accompanying text (citing cases conforming to classic
paradigm).
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tampering" conduct,265 meaningful forfeiture inquiry demands an
understanding of the context in which a domestic violence victim
"chooses"2" not to cooperate with prosecutorial efforts.
To illustrate the failure of this analogy,267 I first consider how
forfeiture doctrine applies quite easily to the types of conduct
typically associated with witness tampering in non-intimate
relationships.268 In the classic forfeiture scenario, a person charged
with a crime wrongfully procures the unavailability of a witness who
would have testified to the accused's involvement in the underlying
(charged) crime. At trial, the defendant may not assert confrontation
rights to bar the introduction of prior statements made by the
unavailable witness with respect to the charged crime.269 For instance,
where a defendant awaiting trial on murder charges makes
threatening calls from jail to a witness to the murder, the defendant
may be deemed to have forfeited his confrontation rights by
intimidating the witness into silence.270 Accordingly, prior statements
by the now-unavailable witness may be admitted at the defendant's
murder trial.271
One distinguishing feature of this forfeiture template is that the
"tampering misconduct" is clearly distinct from the behavior
265. See id.
266. For compelling insight into tensions surrounding the construction of "choice" in
the domestic violence context, see generally Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or
Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE
VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 59,59 (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (exploring the "challenge of analyzing structures of
oppression while including an account of the resistance, struggles, and achievements of the
oppressed").
267. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (noting limited value of analogy).
268. In light of my argument, it is somewhat ironic that the seminal forfeiture case,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), involved an accused and an absent witness
who were married. See supra note 216 (describing the facts of Reynolds). The Court's
recognition that Reynolds's influence over his wife caused her unavailability accurately
suggests that, in the domestic realm, what is needed to procure a witness's absence may be
different than what would be required in other contexts. See id. Reynolds factually
diverges from many domestic violence cases, however, in that the defendant's conduct was
deliberately targeted at the testimony of his wife in an upcoming trial. See supra note 238.
Moreover, other than the Court's finding that Reynolds "kept [the witness] away,"
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 151-52, specifically so that she could not be served with a subpoena
for trial, there is no evidence that Reynolds was engaged in an abusive course of conduct.
269. For a more thorough discussion of "[tihe classic Case for Forfeiture," see Deahl,
supra note 225, at 608-09 (noting that "[w]hile the Supreme Court has not made much use
of the [forfeiture] doctrine, every Circuit to address the issue has recognized this
application of forfeiture"); Flanagan, supra note 215, at 466-72. For cases illustrating this
archetype, see infra note 303 and accompanying text.
270. State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341,347 (Minn. 2004).
271. Id.
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constituting the charged crime. 72 By contrast, in cases involving what
has been termed "reflexive forfeiture," the defendant is charged with
the very same conduct that caused the unavailability of a witness. 73
To illustrate the point: assume that a defendant who kills a key
witness in a pending narcotics prosecution is subsequently tried for
the murder of the witness-turned-victim. In deciding Confrontation
Clause challenges when the defendant tampers with a witness to a
prior crime and is later prosecuted for this tampering activity, courts
272. In this type of case, courts have generally not required proof of the defendant's
underlying motive in procuring the absence of the witness. Deahl, supra note 225, at 609
(explaining that no court confronting classic forfeiture facts has required a showing that
the defendant's conduct was specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying).
To place any importance on this motive, a court would have to effectively say, "You would
not be able to object to the admission of this testimony had you killed [the victim] to keep
her from testifying, but since you killed her only to get revenge, your objection is allowed
and [the victim's] testimony is precluded notwithstanding the fact that you killed her." Id.
A court clinging to this distinction could not be viewed as one concerned with equity, but,
instead, as prioritizing a contrived formal limitation.
273. Richard Friedman describes and defends the "reflexive forfeiture" principle as
follows:
Suppose that the conduct that rendered the declarant-victim unavailable, rather
than occurring at some time after the crime charged, was the crime charged ....
In such a case, for the court to conclude that the accused committed the act
rendering the declarant-victim unavailable, the court must also conclude that the
defendant committed the criminal act charged, because those two acts are the
same .... I do not believe, however, that this identity presents a reason not to
apply the forfeiture principle. The identity should not distract us from the
importance of deciding the evidentiary predicate. If the predicate is true, then...
the defendant's inability to confront the declarant is attributable to his own
misconduct. And if that is true, the defendant should not be able to keep the
declarant's statement out of evidence by a claim of the confrontation right. A
court should not decline to decide the predicate question, for evidentiary
purposes, simply because the same question must also be decided in making the
bottom-line determination of guilt.
Friedman, supra note 206, at 521-22.
The California Supreme Court is currently considering the application of
"reflexive forfeiture" in a case involving statements by a murder victim regarding abuse by
the defendant. People v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review
granted, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004). The court certified the following questions:
Did defendant forfeit his Confrontation Clause claim regarding admission of the
victim's prior statements concerning an incident of domestic violence ... under the
doctrine of "forfeiture by wrongdoing" because defendant killed the victim, thus
rendering her unavailable to testify at trial? Does the doctrine apply where the
alleged "wrongdoing" is the same as the offense for which defendant was on trial?
102 P.3d at 930.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85
have generally applied the principle of forfeiture to allow in evidence
the prior statements of the absent witness.274
In important ways, the factual predicates onto which forfeiture
doctrine has traditionally been grafted275 differ from those typically
presented by domestic violence cases. At least one court has
acknowledged the tension between the standard forfeiture framework
and prosecutions involving battering, noting that "[a]pplication of the
'wrongdoing' exception to the Confrontation Clause undoubtedly will
be difficult in many domestic violence cases where a victim does not
cooperate with the prosecution." '276 Put differently, application of
forfeiture doctrine to violence between intimates entails a collision of
paradigms: paradigmatic witness tampering-which, again, provides
the template for traditional forfeiture inquiry277-and paradigmatic
battering are too factually disparate to be yoked by a single,
undifferentiating legal doctrine.
The ongoing course of conduct that characterizes abusive
relationships 78 undermines classic forfeiture analysis for a number of
reasons. In most battering relationships, there is no clear conceptual
divide between a defendant's "prior crime" and his "tampering
conduct." '2 79 A domestic violence victim's noncooperation is typically
274. See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 651 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F. Supp. 352, 357-
58 (D. Mass. 1995); see also Deahl, supra note 225, at 609-11 (offering a fuller discussion
of this narrow application of "reflexive forfeiture").
275. Cf. Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 969-71 (summarizing evolution of the criminal
justice response to domestic violence and suggesting the importance of a historical
perspective for understanding current structural deficiencies).
276. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 829 N.E.2d
444 (2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
277. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
279. Even outside the domestic violence context, forfeiture arguments are occasionally
raised in cases where the defendant is charged with a crime that causes the unavailability
of a victim who did not witness separate criminal activity. See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d
789, 792-93 (Kan. 2004). This application-which, according to one commentator, has
emerged only post-Crawford-is receiving mixed treatment by lower courts. Flanagan,
supra note 206, at 483-84; see also Deahl, supra note 225, at 611-13, nn.69-70 (surveying
post-Crawford cases involving the "broader application of reflexive forfeiture").
Forfeiture analysis based on this type of factual predicate-involving no "prior crime" to
which the victim was witness and no "tampering conduct" apart from the charged
conduct-will likely arise in the non-domestic context relatively infrequently and almost
always where the defendant is charged with homicide and the victim made statements
admissible under the evidentiary rules. Because battering involves dynamics that are
fundamentally different from those presented by this type of case, see supra notes 280-305,
judicial analysis of the forfeiture question under these circumstances is of limited
analogical value for purposes of this discussion.
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caused-either in whole or in part28°-by abuse that occurred prior to
the arrest for the latest incident.281 In some cases, the charged crime
is itself largely responsible for the victim's unavailability.282 Indeed, it
is often impossible to isolate the "tampering conduct" from the crime
itself,283 because the nature of the relationship between a batterer and
his victim frequently renders superfluous acts aimed specifically at
procuring trial absence.28
The case of Heard v. Commonwealth 2 5  illustrates this
proposition. Marquis Heard was convicted of assault and trespass for
an incident involving Andreal (Angel) Saunders, the mother of his
child. 6 The prosecution proved that Marquis came to the home of
Angel's grandmother (whom Angel was visiting), "knocked the door
off its hinges ... then assaulted Angel by hitting her in the head with
the butt of a handgun; he left the premises with their child., 287 Before
leaving, "Heard pointed the gun at [Angel] and told her that the only
reason he did not shoot her was that the gun was broken."28 8 Police
and emergency workers responded to the scene, where Angel was
bleeding from multiple head wounds.289 Shortly thereafter, the
defendant telephoned Angel's grandmother and threatened "that he
would kill Angel and himself if they reported the incident to the
police., 290 Eight months later, Angel failed to appear for trial despite
280. See infra notes 285-307 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
contextualizing misconduct).
281. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
282. See infra notes 285-97.
283. The discussion that follows tends to support the proposition that existing criminal
law definitions of domestic violence fail to capture the full spectrum of battering conduct.
See generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 17 (critiquing adequacy of substantive criminal
law's response to domestic violence).
284. While it is often impossible to identify a "tampering" behavior that is distinct from
an abusive course of conduct (even as a theoretical matter), this is not always the case.
Many batterers engage in efforts specifically targeted at procuring the unavailability of the
victim at trial-for instance, threatening to kill her if she cooperates with prosecutorial
efforts. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 807 (Minn. 2005) (involving a defendant
who menaced his girlfriend with a gun and made calls from jail threatening that "if she
doesn't do what he wants someone will come over to her house and do something to her");
supra note 237 (explaining the specific intent requirement in the evidentiary context).
Even when a batterer behaves in ways that correspond more closely to traditional
understandings of "tampering," however, his actions are contextualized by a relationship
characterized by the violent exercise of power. See Fischer, supra note 100, at 2120-26.
285. No. 2002-CA-002494-MR, 2004 WL 1367163 (Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004).
286. Id. at *1.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. The paramedic at the scene was listening to this telephone conversation and
overheard the defendant's threat. Id. In fact, "Heard made no fewer than three threats to
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having been served with two subpoenas.29' The trial was postponed
for a month and a warrant issued for her arrest.2" When Angel did
not appear for trial on the rescheduled date, the prosecution elected
to proceed without her.293
While the facts of Heard were not developed to support a
forfeiture argument,294 certain observations about the relationship
between Marquis and Angel-and the reasonable implications that
flow from them-are suggestive of limitations of traditional forfeiture
analysis in the battering context. We see that there is no neat
sequential divide between previous criminal conduct, charged
criminal conduct, and tampering conduct; the ongoing course of
conduct that began long before Marquis broke down the door to the
home where Angel was visiting did not suddenly end when law
enforcement appeared at the crime scene.
Similarly, it is impossible to isolate with precision which act
"caused" the unavailability of Angel at trial.295 The charged conduct
itself-Marquis assaulting Angel with a handgun and informing her
that he would have shot her had the gun not been "broken"-was a
probable contributor to Angel's unwillingness to cooperate with
prosecutorial efforts. The threats conveyed to her grandmother
kill Angel during the brief telephone conversation"; one, in particular, was frighteningly
vivid: "Next level, lock-up, will kill Angel." Id. at *6.
291. Id. at *2.
292. Id.; see infra note 314 (discussing the unavailability analysis in the domestic
violence context).
293. Heard, 2004 WL 1367163, at *2. The trial court admitted into evidence statements
made by Angel on the evening of the incident describing the assault to her grandmother,
to a responding police officer, and to the doctor at the hospital where she was taken for
treatment. Id. The jury convicted, and the defendant appealed based in part on a claim
that his confrontation rights were violated by the introduction of Angel's out-of-court
statements. Id. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held, pursuant to Crawford, that
statements made to the responding officer were testimonial in nature and should not have
been admitted, but that the error was harmless. Id. The court did not address whether the
defendant forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights, presumably because the argument
was not advanced by the prosecution. Id.
294. Reasoned speculation about the factual predicate for a forfeiture argument is
inherently challenging in this context, given that appellate recitations of facts are
necessarily limited to the issues developed at trial and, as I am suggesting, the applicability
of forfeiture principles to the typical battering case may require an evolution in judicial
thinking. Nevertheless, it is possible to surmise how forfeiture might apply to some cases
based on the court's discussion of related factual issues.
295. The doctrinal focus on identifying a particular act of misconduct that can be said
to have caused the victim's unavailability is likely related to a judicial preoccupation with
the defendant's intent. See supra Part III.A (critiquing the application of the specific
intent requirement in the domestic violence context).
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presumably played a role 29 6 but so, in all likelihood, did myriad other
controlling behaviors-some meaningful only or especially to Angel,
perhaps not appearing controlling at all to the outside observer-
occurring throughout the relationship between Angel and Marquis. 297
Without an appreciation of the importance of context, and a sense of
the patterned nature of battering, the judicial forfeiture inquiries will
be unduly restrictive.
In many battering relationships, abuse occurring prior to the
crime for which the defendant is being tried causes the victim's
noncooperation. Threats to harm, or kill, a woman if she ever calls
the police or testifies for the prosecution are used as a mechanism of
control.298 These threats may be explicit or implicit, they are often
leveled against the victim's children and other family members, and
they are no less real or powerful than the classic witness tamperer's
call from jail299 by virtue of having been announced prior to the crime
for which the batterer happens to be standing trial. We see, then, that
the conventional notion that someone who witnesses a crime later
becomes subject to a defendant's efforts to prevent her testimony is
often inapt in the domestic violence context; the chronology that
comports with reality is not nearly so linear.3°°
In some cases, of course, the defendant engages in misconduct
occurring after the charged crime in a manner that causes the victim's
unavailability."1  Here, too, the difficulty of importing the
"tampering" construct to the domestic violence context-where the
significance of a particular act is deeply embedded in a
relationship3°2-becomes readily apparent.303 In marked contrast to
296. In my practice experience, threats made to family members are a common tactic
employed by batterers to prevent victims from cooperating with prosecutors, particularly
where post-arrest, pre-trial communication with the victim directly is impossible or
unfeasible.
297. See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
298. See Lininger, supra note 6, at 769 ("The reasons why victims refuse to cooperate
with the prosecution are manifold, but chief among them is the risk of reprisals by the
batterers. One study found that batterers threaten retaliatory violence in as many as half
of all cases, and 30 percent of batterers actually assault their victims again during the
predisposition phase of prosecution." (citing Randall Fritzier & Lenore Simon, Creating a
Domestic Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 Cr. REV. 28, 33 (2000))).
299. See infra note 304.
300. See supra notes 279-99.
301. Here, the question of what "misconduct" qualifies as a forfeiture of confrontation
rights is put in starkest relief, though the inquiry is relevant regardless of when the
(mis)conduct which caused the victim's absence occurred in relation to the charged crime.
302. See infra note 305 (explaining the significance of relationship to understanding the
act's meaning).
303. This tension relates to a concern articulated by the Hammon Court:
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the archetypical tampering case, in which courts have little trouble
seeing the likely effect of a murder defendant's call from jail
threatening to kill a witness if she testifies,3" the meaning that a
domestic violence victim ascribes to her accuser's conduct can rarely
be understood or evaluated without reference to the abusive
relationship. °"
Deviations from the standard tampering/forfeiture model
represent a formidable conceptual challenge for courts faced with
interpreting the meaning of forfeiture in the domestic violence
context. Unless the dynamics of abuse are taken into account, the
forfeiture principle cannot be faithfully applied to the domestic
violence realm.3"6 Insight into the nature of battering is thus essential
for the equitable underpinnings of forfeiture3 7 to be realized.
The question will probably also frequently arise as to what amounts to
"wrongdoing" by a defendant in such a scenario, i.e., will only physical
"wrongdoing" (another battery) by a defendant suffice, or can psychological
pressure on a victim not to cooperate be enough, and if so, how is such pressure to
be measured?
Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), affid, 829 N.E.2d 444
(2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
304. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. 2004). For other cases
involving post-indictment tampering conduct against a non-intimate, in conformity with
the classic paradigm, see United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992)
(illustrating that a defendant's verbal and written threats to a witness caused
unavailability); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788 (2d Cir. 1984) (illustrating
that a defendant's threats to witness caused unavailability); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d
1100, 1101-02 (6th Cir. 1983) (illustrating that a threatening visit from the defendant's
"investigators" caused a witness's unavailability); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624,
629 (10th Cir. 1979) (illustrating that a defendant's threat caused witness unavailability);
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1352-53 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); People v. Straker,
662 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (same); State v. Magouirk, 561 So. 2d 801,
804 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (same).
305. "[R]elationship provides the terrain on which a batterer's system of domination is
enacted; relationship is essential to grasping the full measure of harm inflicted by the
abuser and suffered by the victim; relationship connects and organizes what might
otherwise appear to be random acts." Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 973-74; see Fischer
et al., supra note 100, at 2120 ("In battering relationships ... cultural components become
an extension of the pattern of domination itself .... A gesture that seems innocent to an
observer is instantly transformed into a threatening symbol to the victim of abuse. It is a
threat that carries weight because similar threats with their corresponding consequences
have been carried out before, perhaps many times.").
306. A separate but related concern is that traditional applications of forfeiture have
become so firmly embedded in our legal culture that prosecutors are not raising forfeiture
arguments in cases in which the facts warrant it. This prosecutorial failure of imagination
both impedes the development of judicial understandings of domestic violence and is
enabled by it. Cf. Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 1012-13 (discussing the application of
stalking statutes to battering conduct that occurs over time, and noting that, while there
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C. Forfeiture Reconceived
I have posited that in many, if not most, cases of victimless
domestic violence prosecution, a batterer's conduct over time has
caused the victim's unavailability.30 Accepting the truth of this
proposition, it does not answer the question of how judges are to
determine whether a particular defendant has forfeited his
constitutional rights.3 9 Importantly, "forfeiture cannot be assumed
without specific evidence linking a defendant to a complainant's
failure to testify at trial."31 The procedures for evaluating whether
the defendant forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction,31' but courts typically require an
are no legal impediments to this type of prosecution, "it does not comport with social
understandings" and has yet to become standard practice).
307. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
308. Crawford did not change the law governing unavailability. See Friedman, supra
note 10, at 8 ("In applying the unavailability requirement to prior testimony under the
Roberts regime, the Court developed a body of case law concerning when the prosecution
has adequately proven unavailability, and for better or worse that case law, including part
of Roberts itself, is left untouched."). "Unavailability" for purposes of constitutional
forfeiture analysis generally requires the prosecutor to show "reasonable efforts in good
faith" to secure the witness's presence. See, e.g., People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 681
(Colo. 1983) ("Unavailability 'in the constitutional sense' is established by the prosecution
when good faith, reasonable efforts have been made to produce the witness without
success."); cf State v. Nix, No. C-030696, 2004 WL 2315035, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 15,
2004) (explaining that in the evidentiary forfeiture context, sworn hearing testimony to
this effect required for judicial finding of unavailability).
309. Cf Raeder, supra note 18, at 361 ("Some prosecutors are already arguing that
domestic violence cases by their nature involve forfeiture when the victim does not testify.
They claim defendants invariably either actually threatened complainants or, given the
circumstances of their relationships, such women are afraid that their testimony will cause
further violence." (emphasis added)). Apropos of a concern that domestic violence
victims' statements will be categorically immune from Confrontation Clause challenge, I
wholeheartedly agree with Tom Lininger's observation that "not every [domestic violence]
assault carries with it the threat of reprisals if the victim cooperates with law enforcement.
If courts were to presume such tampering in every domestic violence case, the forfeiture
exception would swallow the rule of confrontation." Lininger, supra note 13, at 407.
310. Raeder, supra note 18, at 361. By "specific evidence," I am contemplating proof
of how the particular defendant on trial, by his battering conduct, caused the victim's
unavailability. See supra notes 278-305 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which
battering conduct may result in a victim's trial absence). In my view, this requisite linkage
largely alleviates fears that forfeiture will be too radically expanded. For various
expressions of this concern, see, e.g., Lininger, supra note 13, at 407 ("support[ing] the
forfeiture doctrine as a general matter, but [worrying] that it will become too expansive"
after Crawford); Flanagan, supra note 215 at 546 (noting the risk of "remov[ing]
confrontation in an entire class of criminal prosecutions"); Raeder, supra note 18, at 355,
364 (suggesting a limiting principle that, while "witness tampering rationale" should be
inapplicable in cases where a domestic violence victim is alleged to have been killed by the
defendant, it should be required in cases where the declarant is still alive).
311. See Flanagan, supra note 215, at 488-92.
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evidentiary hearing312 at which the prosecution has the burden of
proving313  that the defendant's misconduct caused the trial
unavailability314 of the witness.
312. Id. at 488. In the constitutional context, the requirement of an evidentiary hearing
on the forfeiture issue seems particularly warranted. See infra notes 322-26 and
accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary hearing in People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02,
2003 WL 21507176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003)); see also Adam M. Krischer, "Though
Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid": Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic
Violence Cases, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14 (describing various ways of proving
a batterer's responsibility for procuring victim unavailability, including prison phone
records, jailhouse phone recordings, voicemail messages, e-mail, eyewitnesses to threats,
and expert testimony on the effects of battering). In my prosecutorial experience, many
victims are, at some point in the process, quite candid about their reasons for wishing
charges to be "dropped"; their hearsay statements should be admissible at a forfeiture
hearing. Even so, as litigation strategies shift in the wake of Davis, the prosecutorial
resources which will be expended to prove forfeiture should not be underestimated. See
Raeder, supra note 18, at 365 (discussing the costs associated with proving forfeiture, and
questioning "whether such resources would be available for misdemeanors, which
encompass a large percentage of the domestic violence caseload").
313. "The forfeiture decision is a preliminary fact question for the judge, so unless state
practice requires admissible evidence, the court can consider hearsay in its determination.
Because forfeiture can have a significant impact at trial, a few states require clear and
convincing evidence for the preliminary showing." Raeder, supra note 18, at 365. Most
courts, however, have applied the preponderance of evidence standard when determining
whether the prosecution has met its burden of persuasion. See Lininger, supra note 13, at
407 (citing courts applying the preponderance of evidence standard). In Davis, while
declining to adopt a "position on the standards necessary to demonstrate" forfeiture,
Justice Scalia noted that courts making evidentiary forfeiture rulings pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) have generally required of the prosecution proof by a
preponderance of the evidence and allowed inadmissible hearsay to be considered at the
hearing stage. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).
314. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. Without purporting to resolve the
issue, it is worth observing that what "reasonableness" requires in the domestic violence
context may be distinct. In this vein, consider the case of Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960
(Ind. 2004), which concluded that a victim's out-of-court statement was not testimonial
and, therefore, that its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 964. In
dicta (because its holding on the testimonial question obviated a need to reach the
forfeiture issue), the Fowler court noted that prior to trial, a police officer had "threatened
[a domestic violence victim] with a charge of filing a false police report if she refused to
testify against [the defendant]." Id. at 965. After suggesting that domestic violence
victims "might choose to recant or not cooperate" for a variety of reasons, the court
opined: "A domestic violence victim should not be placed in the situation of being
intimidated not only by the aggressor, but also by the State and its representatives." Id.
The "reasonableness" of prosecutorial efforts calibrated to context may be partly
dependent on whether the dynamics of battering warrant any degree of deference to a
victim's expression of noncooperation. Must a prosecutor subpoena a victim for trial in
order to satisfy the "unavailability" prong of forfeiture analysis? If a victim fails to appear
in response to a subpoena, must she be arrested and brought to court? Should a
subpoenaed victim be arrested in anticipation of her testimony? These questions are not
simply academic: after Crawford, prosecutors are increasingly relying on material witness
warrants to ensure the availability of victims at trial. See Lininger, supra note 6, at 787
("Unfortunately, some of the victims have had to remain in custody until the trial which is
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It may well be that, if forfeiture is rightly conceptualized,
domestic violence prosecutors will frequently be able to prove to a
judge's satisfaction that the defendant's misconduct procured the
victim's unavailability.315 This would suggest, however, not that the
principle of forfeiture is being incorrectly applied316 but, rather, that
the law is properly accounting for the realities of the uncooperative
domestic violence victim.
For a forfeiture analysis that reflects judicial understanding of
these dynamics, we return to the case of Victor Santiago.317 Because
the prosecution sought to try Santiago without the testimony of
Angela,318 the court granted the prosecutor's motion for a pre-trial
evidentiary hearing319 to determine whether the prosecution had
proven32° that the defendant "procured the victim's unavailability
a TERRIBLE message we are sending to the victim, her children, the defendant and
society." (emphasis added)).
Crawford and its progeny present domestic violence prosecutors with a difficult
dilemma: in order to successfully advance a forfeiture argument, extreme measures to
procure the victim's trial attendance may be required. See supra notes 79-95 and
accompanying text (discussing reasons for and manifestations of victim noncooperation).
As judicial understandings of forfeiture in the battering realm evolve, it is reasonable to
expect that the law regarding witness unavailability will concomitantly develop in a
manner that accounts for the particularities of domestic violence. See infra Conclusion
(identifying the default alignment of a triangular relationship between the accuser,
accused, and state in domestic violence cases). In the meantime, depending on how
"unavailability" is interpreted, resort to forfeiture arguments will often be, from the
prosecutorial perspective, an unattractive alternative; judicial resolution of the testimonial
inquiry (which, of course, does not require any showing of victim unavailability) thus
remains critical. Cf People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 2, 2004) (deciding case on forfeiture grounds, rather than addressing whether
"testimonial" definition was properly applied by the lower court).
315. See supra note 284 (discussing the frequency of "tampering" in domestic violence
cases).
316. See supra note 310 (describing the skepticism of commentators).
317. See supra notes 45-81 and accompanying text. With the sole exception of
Santiago, I have found no written opinion in a domestic violence case that conceptualizes
forfeiture in the manner that I am advocating.
318. The prosecution sought to introduce various out-of-court statements made by
Angela describing the events in question. People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 WL
21507176, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003); see also supra notes 70-75 and accompanying
text.
319. "The People's papers demonstrated a distinct possibility that the defendant
engaged in witness tampering," mandating what is known in New York as a Sirois hearing.
Id. at *1; see In re Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 92 A.2d 405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); supra note
312 and accompanying text (arguing that an evidentiary hearing and individualized
determination should be required).
320. In New York, the prosecution bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence. See, e.g., People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995); see supra note 312
(noting jurisdictional variance in the burden of proof).
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through violence, threats, or chicanery."32' After hearing testimony
from Angela,322 the police domestic violence counselor,323 one of the
responding police officers, the assistant district attorney with whom
Angela had discussed her reluctance to testify,324 an expert on
domestic violence, and Santiago himself,32 the court concluded that
Santiago's misconduct had caused Angela's absence; accordingly,
Santiago forfeited his right to object to the introduction of her out-of-
court statements.326
Accepting that the defendant's "longstanding pattern of physical
and emotional abuse toward Angela R. effectively forced her to
become unavailable as a witness for the People at trial, '327 the court's
opinion-the only one of its kind328 --is instructive less for its result
than for its reasoning about domestic violence. The Santiago court
expressly repudiated the defendant's efforts to analogize to the
traditional tampering paradigm. 329  Rejecting the notion that
misconduct can only cause a victim's unavailability if it takes place
after the occurrence of the charged crime,33° the court observed that
321. Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *1.
322. For a summary of Angela's hearing testimony, see id. at *9. This case is somewhat
unusual in that the prosecution was able to call Angela as a witness at the forfeiture
hearing. Often, a victim can neither be located nor her presence secured for this type of
hearing, requiring prosecutors alleging forfeiture to prove it using other types of evidence.
See supra note 311 (discussing types of evidence admissible at a forfeiture hearing).
323. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
324. Id.
325. Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *2.
326. Pursuant to the governing legal framework, the court did not disaggregate analysis
of potential constitutional and evidentiary challenges. The law in New York precludes a
defendant whose "violence, threats, or chicanery" causes a witness's unavailability "from
asserting either 'the constitutional right of confrontation or the evidentiary rules against
the admission of hearsay in order to prevent the admission of the witness's out-of-court
declarations.' " People v. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d 68, 69 (N.Y. 1998) (quoting People v. Geraci,
85 N.Y.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1995)).
327. Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *1. The court, recognizing the "frequency with
which battered women seek to withdraw as witnesses," noted that "if the witness's earlier
statements become admissible according to the [applicable legal] standards, considerable
public benefit can be anticipated." Id. at *2.
328. See supra note 316 (noting that Santiago was exceptional for its forfeiture
conceptualization).
329. Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *14. It is interesting to see that the defendant
explicitly invoked the traditional model in order to contrast it with his own conduct: "The
defendant argues that this distinguishes this case from others in which a witness's prior
statements were properly admitted because the defendant's misconduct, committed
between the inception of the case and the date of trial, was found sufficiently threatening
to have caused the witness's unavailability." Id.
330. Id. (articulating, and rejecting, defendant's argument that Angela's "current
reluctance to testify is not as a result of any misconduct committed by him since the
inception of this case" and that the facts before the court are distinguishable "from others
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domestic violence is sufficiently distinct from prototypical witness
tampering so as to justify a broader view of the relevant time frame."'
Further, the opinion acknowledges that a domestic violence
defendant's conduct must be viewed in context in order to evaluate its
significance to the forfeiture inquiry. Since battering is deeply
embedded in a relationship, and it occurs over time, the court's
forfeiture analysis contemplates a "pattern of behavior [that] causes
the victim of domestic abuse to succumb to the offender's
importuning in ways that others might not."'332 In short, determining
whether Santiago caused Angela's unavailability demanded a judicial
inquiry that was more temporally encompassing, more expansive in
its definition of "misconduct," and more attentive to the relational as
compared to the traditional forfeiture analysis.333
in which a witness's prior statements were properly admitted because the defendant's
misconduct, committed between the inception of the case and the date of trial, was found
sufficiently threatening to have caused the witness's unavailability" (emphasis added)).
331. Id. at *15 ("1 do not believe that the cases admitting prior testimony of an
unavailable witness should be read to hold that prior evidence given by an unavailable
witness is admissible only when the defendant's misconduct causing the unavailability
occurs between the defendant's arrest and the date of trial. While that may occur in the
usual case, domestic violence matters are of such a different character as to justify a
broader application of the rule.").
332. Id. The court explained:
[T]he defendant's pattern of behavior causes the victim of domestic abuse to
succumb to the offender's importuning in ways that others might not. Thus,
attempts to become unavailable as a prosecuting witness cannot be viewed as we
might see voluntary withdrawal in a case where the complainant and the defendant
are strangers to one another. Nor, can such withdrawal be viewed as having been
made without the misconduct of the defendant when it is attempted during the
honeymoon phase of a cycle of violence filled, as it is here, with a mix of fear, false
hope, a sense of guilt and weakness of will all resulting from the defendant[']s
prior behavior.
Id.
333. The court elaborated on how battering dynamics undermine traditional forfeiture
analysis as follows:
[D]omestic violence cases are different because of the complainant's desire for a
stable relationship and the exploitation of that desire by the defendant. The
hallmark of such cases is the hope for a brighter future with the abuser held by the
complainant who is weakened by past abuse and seduced by untrustworthy
gestures of love but, whose expectations are eventually met with repeated abuse to
the perverse satisfaction of the abuser. In other kinds of cases there has been
little, if any, intimate interaction between the parties and generally there is no
expectation of a future relationship. As I have noted, in the vast majority of cases
victims pursue their complaints seeking retribution and safety from the process
provided by the police and courts. Such complainants, although sometimes
apprehensive, follow through because they have the strength, the will and the need
to do so. Victims of domestic violence do not have the will to follow through ....
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Equation of the parameters of forfeiture in battering cases with
forfeiture in other types of prosecutions is expressly disavowed:
[I]n other kinds of cases we have often taken for granted that a
complainant's desire to withdraw from the prosecution was
based on the simple unwillingness to get involved in the
process, or give up the time it takes to follow through on the
complaint, or because of the witness's unsubstantiated fears of
reprisal from some unspecified source. We have frequently not
looked beyond those excuses in such cases where no proof was
immediately available that a particular and recent act of
misconduct by the defendant had brought about the witness's
unavailability .... However, I do not believe domestic violence
cases are of the same character as other kinds of cases .... 334
By forsaking the narrow analytic lens of standard forfeiture inquiry,
the court's decision responds to the challenge of evolving a forfeiture
doctrine with meaning for a category of crime that does not comport
with the traditional paradigm.335
The court's conclusion that "domestic violence matters are of
such a different character as to justify a broader application of the
rule" is, of course, not without qualification;36 the opinion is
This is so not only because of the psychological damage done by repeated abuse
but, also because there lurks in the mind of such complainants the fear of physical
retaliation to themselves and their children at the hands of an offender whose past
behavior toward the complainant makes it highly probable that such abuse will"
occur again.
Id.
334. Id. at *14.
335. Recall that the court heard testimony from an expert on battering and its effects.
Id. at *2. It is also apparent that the court was well aware of the "frequency with which
battered women seek to withdraw as witnesses" and that the court's novel application of
forfeiture "may affect the prosecution of similar cases involving domestic violence." Id.
336. Id. at *14. The court observes that "the evidentiary consequences would be
different in this case if the complainant's choice not to go forward were premised
exclusively on feelings of love and loyalty to the defendant." Id. at *16. In Santiago,
however,
the violent domestic history of these two people, and defendant's recent persistent
importuning of the complainant to withdraw from this prosecution, have made
clear that Angela R.'s choice with respect to continuing this prosecution was not
made without fear of the defendant .... Indeed, abuse of the complainant by the
defendant is the recurrent theme in the relationship between these two parties.
Id.
The Santiago court rightly recognized that love and loyalty are frequent sequilae
of abuse and, as suggested by the relationship between Angela and Victor, often
indications that the batterer has been particularly successful in his efforts to control the
victim. Id. By way of contrast, if a victim's unwillingness to cooperate with the
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appropriately limited by the constructs of misconduct and causation
that have always framed forfeiture analysis.337 Indeed, the court's
reasoning may be viewed as an endeavor to fairly import the principle
of forfeiture into a context that fundamentally departs from the crime
template with which it historically has been linked. Santiago's
interpretation of forfeiture thus constitutes a reassessment that
remains true to its normative foundations.33 8
Battering is in essence different from crimes that occupy a more
historically privileged, less equivocal place in our criminal justice
prosecution is "premised exclusively on feelings of love and loyalty to the defendant," id.
(emphasis added)-i.e., if her emotional connection to the defendant was not caused and
is not maintained by a pattern of domination and abuse-the defendant's misconduct
would not be responsible for procuring the unavailability of his victim. Under these
circumstances, a prosecutor's forfeiture argument would fail. While I do not pretend that
courts will easily engage in these types of fact-bound determinations, or that the effects of
complicating factors such as a victim's economic dependence on her batterer are easily
assessed, practical challenges should not overwhelm a desire for conceptual coherence in
this area of law. Indeed, criminal remediation of domestic violence cases often requires
inquiry easily dismissed as messy or overly intimate. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at
1027-28 (critiquing the notion that "legal entanglement in the messy imbroglio of intimacy
is dangerous and ultimately doomed").
337. To wit:
The credible evidence at this hearing makes very clear that Angela R.'s current
attitude toward testifying is a classic example of a battered woman's reaction to
what has been described as the honeymoon phase of the abusive relationship.
Angela R. is frightened that separation will leave her isolated and without help in
caring for her child and her home. The evidence shows that in the past she has
feared, and she continues to fear, that the defendant's violent behavior will be
directed toward her again and conceivably toward her child.
[T]he violent domestic history of these two people, and defendant's recent
persistent importuning of the complainant to withdraw from this prosecution, have
made clear that Angela R.'s choice with respect to continuing this prosecution was
not made without fear of the defendant .... Thus, in my view, there is clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant's misconduct procured the complainant's
unavailability as a witness in this prosecution and, as a fitting consequence, the
People should be allowed to present evidence of the complainant's prior
statements and Grand Jury testimony regarding this incident to the trial jury.
Santiago, 2003 WL 21507176, at *13, 16.
338. See id. at *16 ("In this case the conclusion is inescapable that this abused
complainant seeks to make herself unavailable as a witness because of the pattern of
misconduct directed toward her by the defendant .... The complainant's decision not to
cooperate with this prosecution is, without a doubt, strongly, if not totally influenced by
the long history of domestic abuse that appears to affect all the decisions made by the
complainant with respect to this defendant.").
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system.339  A meaningful rule of forfeiture contemplates these
distinguishing features and acknowledges their incompatibility with
the traditional forfeiture framework, contesting law's systemic
inattention to relationship. Application of forfeiture principles to
domestic violence thus requires no radical reworking of doctrinal
foundations. Rather, the potential for a reasoned forfeiture analysis
lies in enhanced judicial understanding of the underlying facts and a
willingness to accept the obsolescence of conventional witness
tampering paradigms.
CONCLUSION: A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO THE
CONFRONTATION RIGHT
The approach to confrontation that I have proposed may be
described as "relational.""34 As a method of analyzing what the right
of confrontation entails, the relational question is critical in
prosecutions involving domestic violence. When engaging in the
threshold "testimonial" inquiry, taking into account the dynamics of
abuse challenges conventional notions of exigency derived from and
related to paradigmatic crime between strangers.341 Consideration of
the relational yields a similar reconfiguration of doctrinal parameters
in the forfeiture area, where precedent and analogy are inadequate to
the task of implementing the equitable principles underlying the
rule.3 42 A relational view of forfeiture requires contemplation of the
connection between defendant and victim when determining whether
his misconduct caused her trial unavailability.343 Attending to the
context of relationship essential to battering, I have argued, thus
impacts how the confrontation right is operationalized-a matter of
great import to the future prosecution of domestic violence.34
More broadly, a relational approach may also influence how we
view the meaning of the confrontation right. By synthesizing my
critique of the "testimonial" inquiry and of forfeiture doctrine, an
understanding of the right that is itself relational in nature emerges.
In conclusion, I offer an outline of the normative implications of this
argument.
The meaning of confrontation, I want to argue here, is largely
dependent on the configuration of relationships between accuser,
339. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 17, at 969-71; supra note 17.
340. See supra note 40 (qualifying the use of "relational").
341. See supra Part II.
342. See supra Part III.A-B.
343. See id.
344. See supra Part I.
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state, and accused-a variable scarcely noticed by courts or
commentators.3 45  Theories of confrontation do not remark on this
triangle (accused/accuser/state), which implicitly frames the
conceptual analysis. Rather, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and
scholarship tend to presume particular alliances: accuser with state,
against accused.
We can see how integral this default arrangement is to the
"paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation" suffered by Sir Walter
Raleigh.34 6 In the case against Raleigh, the relationship between state
and accuser was such that the prosecution could very well have
produced Lord Cobham, the quintessential accuser, to testify. Tacitly
invoking this alliance, Raleigh argued:
[I]t is strange to see how you press me still with my Lord
Cobham, and yet will not produce him .... He is in the house
hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be produced
347
In prosecutions for paradigmatic crime,348 the relational triangle
may be generally characterized in this manner: the accuser is "in the
house hard by"; the accused stands alone. In the victimless domestic
violence realm, however, the same cannot be said. Indeed, quite the
opposite is true: in most cases in which the prosecution is proceeding
without a victim,3 49 allegiances underlying the relational triad are
essentially inverted; the accuser is metaphorically, and often
physically, in the house with the accused.
This inversion has real consequences for the functioning of the
confrontation right. Fundamentally, what it means to be an
"accuser" 350 may be different when the witness is a victim of domestic
345. Indeed, I have found no judicial or scholarly treatment that frames the issue in this
manner.
346. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing Sir Walter Raleigh's
case).
347. JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE, THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 157-58 (1850).
348. See supra note 17.
349. While in some cases prosecutors may proceed to trial without a victim simply
because she "would be an unhelpful witness or would be subjected to a difficult cross-
examination," Friedman & McCormack, supra note 129, at 1178, in the vast majority of
victimless prosecutions, it is the preferences of domestic violence victims that drive this
aspect of prosecutorial decisionmaking. See supra note 87 (noting high percentage of
uncooperative domestic violence victims); supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text
(discussing reasons for victim noncooperation).
350. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006); cf. Mosteller, supra note 10,
at 514 n.18 ("Somewhat inexplicably, in my judgment, one aspect that [Crawford's]
historical treatment and preliminary definition leaves out is my particular focus on
2006]
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violence, as inquiry into the "testimonial" nature of a statement
shows. Consistent with the conventional model of crime-which also
seems to resonate with the Crawford majority35 -provision of
information regarding past criminal conduct to law enforcement
transforms a victim/witness into an accuser. By participating in an
effort to apprehend (and, therefore, prosecute) the perpetrator, she
has allied herself with the state, thus triggering attendant obligations
under the Confrontation Clause.3 2
In most domestic violence cases, as we have seen, no such
alliance inheres in a victim's invocation of the law enforcement
apparatus. Viewed narrowly, a battered woman who recounts a
criminal incident to police may be considered an "accuser" but her
actions have a different meaning when seen in context 35 1 Classifying
this type of hearsay as nontestimonial reflects an awareness that a
domestic violence victim has not permanently shifted her allegiance
from defendant to state simply by asking for police protection and,
accusers and accusatory statements, as opposed to testimonial statements. I believe there
should be a role for the concept of 'accusatory' hearsay in the analysis because it better
describes the core concern of the Confrontation Clause than does the testimonial concept.
On the other hand, I recognize that the decisional moment has been reached and that,
despite my arguments, the concept of testimonial statements, rather than accusatory
hearsay or accusatory statements, has been the dominant paradigm. Moreover, if
testimonial is defined using the amicus definition in Crawford and, appropriately
interpreted, it will include most accusatory hearsay. Thus, I focus on testimonial
statements. Nevertheless, I believe the concept of accusatory statements is quite useful in
helping to identify those statements that should be identified as testimonial.").
351. See Crawford v. Washington, 546 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) ("An accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who
makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the
history underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute
concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement."); see also Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274
(quoting same language).
352. In support of his position that the conduct of the declarant, as opposed to the
participation of a government agent, renders a statement testimonial, Richard Friedman
has made the following helpful observation:
If... the source of the information is a human who does understand its likely use,
we can say that she was playing a conscious, knowing role in the criminal justice
system, providing information with the anticipation that it would be used in
prosecution-and that certainly sounds a lot like testifying. Furthermore, without
such understanding on the part of the declarant, the situation lacks the moral
component allowing the judicial system to say in effect, "You have provided
information with the knowledge that it may help convict a person. If that is to
happen, our system imposes upon you the obligation of taking an oath, saying
what you have to say in the presence of the accused, and answering questions put
to you on his behalf."
Friedman, supra note 105, at 259.
353. See supra Part II.
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accordingly, that she is not an "accuser" in the Confrontation Clause
sense of the word.
A similar theoretical claim may be articulated with respect to a
reconceived forfeiture doctrine.5 4  The contextualized judicial
determination that I have urged355 asks whether the alliances
underlying the conventional relational triad have been inverted and,
if so, whether the defendant's battering behavior is causal in the shift.
If so, he may not assert a Confrontation Clause challenge; the default
mandate of state production of the "accuser" makes little sense where
the accused's own misbehavior is responsible for perverting the
paradigmatic relational structure.
Crawford teaches that confrontation has a function beyond
ensuring the reliability of evidence.3 56 While theoretical perspectives
on the value of the right are varied,357 1 contend that the identification
of a relational triangle has implications across the conceptual
spectrum,318 enhancing our understanding of how best to advance
whatever the chosen norm.
To test the power of this observation, consider the idea that
confrontation has a noninstrumental "dignity value,"3 59 a notion that,
in my view, is compelling. From this perspective, the constitutional
requirement of confrontation speaks to the respect afforded the
accused by both the state and the accuser. As Toni Massaro has
explained, "the appropriate question under the individual dignity
354. See supra Part III.
355. See supra Part III.C.
356. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). While Crawford emphasized
that cross-examination is the touchstone of Confrontation Clause analysis, asserting that a
particular procedure is required to effectuate a right seems to me an inadequate
explanation of its meaning. Cf. Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the
Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1261 (2003). Characterizing Richard
Friedman's argument that "reliability is not the raison d'etre for the clause ... [and that]
the confrontation right, like the oath, is one of the fundamental conditions governing the
giving of testimony," id. at 1261 (citing Friedman & McCormack, supra note 129, at 1200),
Sherman Clark suggests:
He has it exactly right I think, as far as he goes, but we need to go farther. Why
should we see confrontation as a "fundamental condition" other than to insure the
reliability of testimony? Why, other than "to advance 'the accuracy of the truth-
determining process in criminal trials,' " might we want to consider this
requirement so important?
Id. at 1261. In my view, the Confrontation Clause may certainly tend to promote the
reliability of admissible evidence without this being its exclusive normative function.
357. See infra notes 359-65 and accompanying text.
358. See id.
359. Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L.
REV. 863, 908 (1988).
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approach is... when will admission of an out-of-court statement deny
the defendant his or her individual dignity?""36 This inquiry, as I have
suggested, is largely dependent on the configuration of relationships
between accuser, state, and accused.361
As a general proposition,362 confrontation advances a dignitary
value because confrontation is how respect for the accused is properly
demonstrated: the state presents the accuser; the accuser testifies in
the presence of the accused. Note how the paradigmatic relational
triangle is embedded in this understanding of what respect requires.
In the victimless domestic violence realm, a reshaped triad of
allegiances alters the meaning of the conventional procedural
mandate-prosecution produces an accuser to be cross-examined by
the accused. If confrontation has a dignitary value, then, what the
right requires cannot be grasped without examination of the
relational.
A similar relational analysis may be applied to competing visions
of the Confrontation Clause, including an "accuser/obligation"
360. Id. Massaro adds:
The confrontation guarantee cannot be explained solely by the claim that face-to-
face encounters may enhance the reliability of the witness's testimony .... The
confrontation guarantee reflects a belief that criminal trials of human beings
should look human to do "justice," and should treat the defendant--even an
alleged child molester-as an equal, dignified participant in the proceedings
against him. These qualities are compromised when government prosecutors use
affidavits, depositions, videotaped testimony, one-way mirrors, or closed-circuit
television testimony to prove their central accusations against the criminal
defendant, no matter how "accurate" those accusations may be. Procedure that is
based on these forms of evidence no longer is an even contest in which the
defendant plays an active, equal, and dignified role.
Id. at 902-03.
In application, Massaro's approach would focus on the availability of a hearsay
declarant; the government would be obligated to produce a declarant unless she were
"genuinely unavailable," in which case her testimony would not be excluded on
Confrontation Clause grounds. Id. at 910-13.
The dignity value of the confrontation guarantee, as it has been defined herein, is
preserved when the government exhausts all feasible alternatives of the use of out-
of-court accusations, and explains to the court why the accuser is not available for
cross-examination by the accused .... [W]hen a face-to-face encounter is
impossible, due to death of the accuser or other circumstances not attributable to
the government, then the out-of-court accusation nevertheless can be admitted
without offending the individual dignity value of the confrontation guarantee.
Id. at 913, 917.
361. See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
362. My use of "general proposition" here refers to cases not involving domestic
violence.
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approach;3 63  a "prosecutorial restraint" or limited government
model;" and even a utilitarian "truth-seeking" understanding of the
right.3 65  Across theoretical orientations, a relational perspective
speaks to what implementation of the confrontation right requires.
363. See Clark, supra note 356, at 1258. According to Clark:
[Tihe Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment ought to be re-understood as
primarily an accuser's obligation rather than primarily as a defendant's right. We
demand that those who would perform this potentially dangerous, morally
weighty, and symbolically loaded act-the act of accusation-be willing to do so
face to face. We impose this requirement not only because out-of-court
accusations are unreliable, though they may often be, but also in response to a
deep, if inchoate, feeling that it is somehow beneath us-inconsistent with our
sense of who we want to be as a community-to allow witnesses against criminal
defendants to "hide behind the shadow" when making an accusation. On this
interpretation, requiring confrontation is a way of reminding ourselves that we are,
or least want to see ourselves as, the kind of people who decline to countenance or
abet what we see as the cowardly and ignoble practice of hidden accusation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
In this regard, the relational question points to an important truth: to understand
the meaning of failure to confront one's accuser-behavior that Sherman identifies as
"cowardly and ignoble," id-the failure must be viewed in context. It may be generally
true that, for victims of paradigmatic crime, shirking one's moral obligation to perform the
"symbolically loaded" act of accusation is worthy of condemnation. See id. In contrast,
for victims of domestic violence, declining to testify against one's abuser in court is typical;
I have suggested that it is also understandable, justifiable and, often, fully rational. See
supra notes 91-96 (discussing the reasons for a domestic violence victim's reluctance to
cooperate with the prosecution). Accordingly, quite apart from doctrinal niceties, the
moral significance of allowing prior statements of battered women into evidence may
require a distinct analysis. See Eileen Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay
Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 641-
45 (1992) (generally describing the dimensions of confrontation as evidentiary, procedural,
and societal, and discussing the "moral responsibility of witnesses as accusers"); cf Clark,
supra note 356, at 1275 ("If our reason for requiring confrontation is meaning-based rather
than merely formal or solely consequentialist, we need to acknowledge that the
unavailability of a witness might, under some circumstances at least, alter our perception
of what it means to make use of a prior out-of-court statement.").
364. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992).
Margaret Berger has expressed a view of the Confrontation Clause that "restrain[s] the
power of the government vis-A-vis the individual." Id. at 561.
[V]iewing the right to confrontation as part of a package of rights concerned with
protection of the people against government oppression promises significant
values and restores a valuable purpose to the clause. In criminal prosecutions, the
ability of the accused and the public to monitor, curb, and expose prosecutorial
abuse remains of utmost importance.
Id. at 562-63 (footnote omitted). For reasons that should by now be obvious, I believe
that where the relational triangle implicitly underlying this vision is inverted, the dictates
of this "limited government" norm are correspondingly impacted.
365. To the extent that a default constitutional requirement of cross-examination
incorporates an inherent skepticism toward the truth of hearsay (as compared to in-court
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In sum, toward the end of discerning whether confrontation
furthers its intended normative purpose, a relational inquiry shows
that the meaning of "absent accuser" is distinct in the battering
context. The departure of domestic violence from a traditional crime
archetype reveals that a particular vision of relationships has, until
now, animated our sense of what the Constitution requires. By
exposing a conceptual triangle that frames Confrontation Clause
challenges, the relational insight advances our understanding of the
confrontation right and how its promise is best realized.
testimony), it is worth noting, as a categorical matter-though certainly not as a universal
proposition-that when statements of domestic violence victims are inconsistent, those
made closer in time to the incident tend to be more reliable than those made at trial. See
Lininger, supra note 6, at 802 (stating that, "considered as a category," statements of
domestic violence victims "generally grow less reliable as trial draws nearer"); Beloof &
Shapiro, supra note 83, at 19-21 ("[T]he initial out of court statement of a domestic
violence victim in a domestic violence case is likely to be the most reliable statement
obtainable.").
Moreover, approaches to confrontation predicated on the truth-seeking value of a
trial often invoke a vision of cross-examination that replicates, to the extent allowed by
civilized notions, an "altercation" between accuser and accused. See, e.g., Brief for
Professors Clark et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2003) (No. 02-9410) (quoting sixteenth century commentator Thomas Smith's
description of the English criminal trial). Confrontation theories that conjure, in essence,
a duel between victim/witness and defendant-a duel that results in the truthful
participant emerging victorious-are, of course, undermined when the accuser and
accused are allied against the state.
